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LATCHING ONTO LACHES: A RULES-BASED
ALTERNATIVE FOR RESOLVING QUESTIONS OF
WAIVER FOLLOWING THE INADVERTENT
PRODUCTION OF PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS IN
FEDERAL COURT ACTIONS
MATTHEW A. REIBER*
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were recently amended to establish a
protocol for asserting privilege and work product claims with respect to documents
that were inadvertently produced during discovery.' The amendment fails to
address, however, the more substantial question of whether the production of such
documents results in a waiver of the applicable privilege or immunity. As a result,
the amendment will not materially affect existing federal practice: one of the parties
will still be required to ask the court for a determination of whether the privilege or
immunity has been waived and the court will still be required to answer the question
under applicable federal or state law.2
The absence of a rules-based standard would be irrelevant, of course, if there
were a uniform common law standard for answering this question. That is not the
case, however. The district courts variously apply three standards for determining
waiver in federal question cases3 and, because controlling precedent exists in only
two circuits,4 they must frequently select the standard on an ad hoc basis. As a
result, different standards are used by different district courts within a circuit and
sometimes by different courts within a judicial district'-situations that cannot be
reconciled with the Supreme Court's admonition that "an uncertain privilege, or one
which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts,
is little better than no privilege at all."6 The problem is compounded in diversity

* Mr. Reiber is an attorney in Tacoma, Washington whose practice emphasizes civil litigation. He
previously taught civil procedure and professional responsibility at Seattle University School of Law.
1. Rule 26(b)(5) now includes the following additional text regarding after-the-fact assertions of privilege
and work product protection:
If information is produced in discovery that is subject to a claim of privilege or protection as
trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may notify any party that received the
information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly return,
sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has and may not use or disclose
the information until the claim is resolved. A receiving party may promptly present the
information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim. If the receiving party
disclosed the information before being notified, it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The
producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
2. The Civil Rules Advisory Committee Note makes clear that the rule "does not address whether the
privilege or protection that is asserted after production was waived by the production." Memorandum from Hon.
Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure 58 (May 27, 2005), availableat
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ReportslCV5-2005.pdf. Instead, the rule provides "a procedure for a party to assert
a claim of privilege or trial-preparation material protection after information is produced in discovery in the action
and, if the claim is contested, permit any party that received the information to present the matter to the court for
resolution." Id. For this reason, the Advisory Committee characterized the amendment as merely a "nod to the
pressures of litigating with the amount and nature of.. .information available in the present age." Id. at 54.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 37-96.
4. See Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
5. See infra notes 105-107.
6. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981).
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cases where the district court must apply state privilege law7 but, because there are
few authoritative state court decisions in this area,8 the district courts must
frequently predict how the highest court of the pertinent state would resolve the
issue with only general principles of privilege law to guide the analysis.9
The absence of a uniform standard would be immaterial if the risk of mistake
were small or the consequence insignificant. That is also not the case. "The
inadvertent production of a privileged document is a specter that haunts every
document intensive case"l°-a specter of increasing proportion due to the vast
number of electronic documents that can be stored on computers and related
devices. 1 A Westlaw search for federal cases involving document discovery in
excess of one million pages generated nearly 200 hits, thus underscoring the
prevalence of document-intensive litigation today.' 2 In this environment, the
possibility that a privileged document will be produced during discovery is more
likely an inevitable consequence of that process. Moreover, the potential loss of the
privilege with respect to all other communications on the same subject raises the
7. See FED. R. EvID. 501 ("[ln civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State,
or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law."). In contrast, federal common
law of privilege applies in federal question cases. Id.("Except as otherwise required.. the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."). And, when
a case involves federal and supplemental state law claims, federal common law applies to both. See Perrignon v.
Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 459 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ("[in federal question cases where pendent state
claims are raised the federal common law of privileges should govern all claims of privilege raised in the
litigation."). Federal common law applies to all claims of work product protection without regard to whether the
case involves federal claims, state claims or both. See Calabro v. Stone, 225 F.R.D. 96, 98-99 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
("Although state law applies to questions of privilege in diversity actions, 'federal law governs the applicability
of the work product doctrine in all actions in federal court."' (quoting Weber v. Paduano, No. 02 Civ. 3392, 2003
WL 161340, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2003))).
8. See infra notes 117-118.
9. See, e.g., Konradi v. United States, 919 F.2d 1207, 1213 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The decision of a federal
court in a diversity case, or in any other case in which state law supplies the rule of decision, is an exercise in
predicting how the highest court of the state would decide the case if it were presented [with] it."); McKenna v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657,661 (3d Cir. 1980) (in the absence of an authoritative determination by a state's
highest court, the disposition of an issue of state law "must be governed by a prediction of how the state's highest
court would decide were it confronted with the problem"). In several diversity cases involving potential waiver due
to the mistaken production of a privileged document, the district court failed to recognize that state law controls
the issue and applied federal common law instead. See infra note 109. In fact, district courts in diversity actions
mistakenly apply federal law more frequently than they correctly apply state law. See infra notes 109-110.
10. F.D.I.C. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 479-80 (E.D. Va. 1991).
11.

See MICHELE C.S. LANGE & KRISTIN M. NIMSGER, ELECTRONiC EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY: WHAT

EVERY LAWYER SHouLD KNow 48 (2004) ("Electronic records present the problem of extreme volume that was
previously unseen in the paper world. Any lawyer who has engaged in large scale document review understands
that the task of reviewing every single piece of paper to determine whether it contains privilege is Herculean.");
PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE LAw & PRACTICE 3 (2005) ("The last two decades have seen exponential
growth in the amount of digital information involved in the normal business activity of most companies."); Richard
L. Marcus, Confrontingthe Future:Coping with Discovery of ElectronicMaterial,64 L. &CONTEMP. PROBs. 253,
261 n.53 (2001) (citing a "very experienced litigator" who contends that the advent of electronic discovery has
"increased discovery retrieval burdens fourfold"); Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation
Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 589-90 (2001) ("For a variety of reasons, it is not difficult to predict that in the majority
of cases, discovery of electronically stored data will result in a geometric increase in the number of documents
produced... For example, one eight-millimeter backup tape can hold as much information as 1500 boxes of
paper.").
12. The search terms used in a terms and connectors search to generate this result in the (allfeds) database
were ("document production" /s "million pages") (produc! / "million pages") (produc! Is "million documents").
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stakes dramatically-thus leading to expensive pre-production review to prevent
disclosure and extensive post-production motion practice to determine the effects
of a mistake.
This Article advocates a rules-based standard for determining whether the
mistaken production of a document waives (or more accurately "forfeits" 13 ) an
applicable privilege or immunity 4 that would apply in both federal question and
diversity cases. In particular, this Article advocates a further amendment to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishing that the mistaken production of a
document does not waive an applicable privilege or immunity so long as the
producing party asserts the privilege or immunity within ten days of learning of the
mistake (with shorter periods applicable when the mistake is discovered in
connection with a motion or at a deposition, hearing, or trial). By establishing a
bright-line standard, most disputes regarding waiver in this context would be
eliminated altogether or would require modest factual presentations from which the
district court could make a prompt decision. In addition, such a rule would protect
the producing party from the harsh consequences that can follow from the mistaken
production of a privileged document, while simultaneously protecting the receiving
party from the prejudice that can flow from the loss of evidence that has been
worked into the fabric of a case. Finally, such a rule would harmonize the
evidentiary rule of waiver with the ethical obligation imposed on attorneys in an
increasing number of jurisdictions to inform the producing party of its mistake and
then refrain from using the pertinent document until the waiver issue is resolved.
Part I briefly reviews the attorney-client privilege and the traditional rule of
waiver by voluntary disclosure, contending that the traditional rule does not apply
especially well to the mistaken production of a privileged document during
discovery. Part II reviews the approaches developed by the federal courts for
resolving the question of waiver in this context and identifies the deficiencies of
each. Part 1H argues that these approaches should be replaced by a uniform rule for
federal question and diversity cases that preserves protection and requires return of
the pertinent document so long as the producing party acts promptly upon learning
of the mistake. This part contends that a simple rule along these lines nearly always
achieves the same outcome as the more elaborate facts and circumstances test

13. The term "waiver" can be misleading because it implies an intentional relinquishment of a known right.
See United States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining the difference between waiver and
forfeiture). A privilege can be lost without any intent to relinquish it or any awareness that it applies in the first
instance. See id. For this reason, some prefer the term "forfeiture" to describe the loss of an evidentiary privilege.
See Panel Discussion, Conference on Electronic Discovery: Panel Six: Rules 26 and/or 34: ProtectionAgainst
Inadvertent Privilege Waiver, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 101, 110 (2004) (statement of Daniel J. Capra). Although
forfeiture may be more precise, waiver is so embedded in case law and legal text that the distinction is meaningless
and the use of the more precise term may create more confusion than illumination.
14. Although courts recognize other privileges, this Article focuses on the attorney-client privilege because
of the significantly greater frequency with which documents covered by this privilege are found within the universe
of documents potentially responsive to a discovery request and are therefore at risk of inadvertent production. In
contrast, documents covered by other privileges ordinarily find their way into the universe of responsive documents
because the producing party waived the privilege by placing the communications at issue (such as waiver of the
doctor-patient privilege by asserting a personal injury claim). Indeed, there do not appear to be any federal cases
involving the mistaken production of a document covered by one of the other privileges.
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preferred by many courts, thus saving substantial time and resources without
sacrificing accuracy in decision making.
I. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WAIVER BY
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
"The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges.. .known to the
common law."' 5 It rests on the assumption that "encouraging clients to make the
fullest disclosure to their attorneys enables the latter to act more effectively, justly
and expeditiously .... ..6 Because a client may be reluctant to share adverse
information with her attorney if there were a chance it could come back to haunt
her, the privilege insulates her comments from forced disclosure in subsequent proceedings and thus allows her to speak freely. 7 Consistent with this "instrumental"
rationale, 8 courts view confidentiality as the essence of the privilege and find
waiver whenever the client voluntarily abandons the secrecy to which she is
entitled. 9 This makes sense: a client who is willing to reveal publicly the matters

15. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). Wigmore dates the privilege to "the reign of
Elizabeth 1, where [it] already appears as unquestioned." 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542 & n. 1
(McNaughton rev. 1961). Others trace the privilege to Roman origins. See 1 KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL.,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 343 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) ("The notion that the loyalty owed by
the lawyer to his client disables him from being a witness in his client's case is deep-rooted in Roman law."); JOHN
WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATrORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENTPRIVILEGE § 1.04, at 1-4 (3d ed. 2000) ("By imperial decree,
Roman advocates were declared incompetent as witnesses in cases in which they had a part.").
16. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, MARGARET A. BERGER &JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
503[02], at 503-16 (1996). The attorney-client privilege attaches when four conditions exist: (1) a
communication, (2) between privileged persons, (3) in confidence and (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing
legal assistance to the client. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD): THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68
(2000). Wigmore provides a more detailed, alternate formulation:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity
as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the
client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the
legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 2292, at 554.
17. The belief that clients would withhold information from their attorneys in the absence of the privilege
is frequently debated. Wigmore characterized this belief as entirely "speculative," WIGMORE, supra note 15, §
2291, at 554, and subsequent commentators have reiterated the point. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG,
CorporateAttorney-Client Privilegein ShareholderLitigation and SimilarCases: Garner Revisited, 12 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 817, 822 (1984) ("The adoption of the privilege represents an educated guess about behavior."); Note,
Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged
CommunicationsDoctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1236 (1962) ("The mythical average American is, as likely as not,
either misinformed or uninformed about the attorney-client privilege."). Others are more optimistic, however. See
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. &W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OFLAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ONTHE MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.6:101, at 128 (2d ed. Supp. 1993) ("Although there is little empirical evidence
of the precise degree to which clients rely on.. confidentiality, it is intuitively obvious that lawyers operating under
a binding requirement of confidentiality will have some greater ability to gain the trust of at least some clients, and
hence to serve them competently.").
18. A noted commentator describes the instrumental justification for privileges as follows: the instrumental
rationale "assumes that a refusal to disclose information to a tribunal is bad and must therefore be justified as
furthering some other social policy. In other words, the evil of nondisclosure is tolerated as an instrument by which
some other good result can be accomplished." 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICEAND PROCEDURE § 5422, at 671 (1980). "By 'an instrumental argument' we mean one that takes the form
'X is good because it will bring about Y'; for example, the argument that the attorney-client privilege is good
because it will encourage clients to be more candid with their lawyers." Id. § 5422.1, at 476 (Supp. 2005).
19. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Oct. 12, 1995, 78 F.3d 251, 254 (6th Cir. 1996) ("By voluntarily
disclosing her attorney's advice to a third party, for example, a client is held to have waived the privilege because
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about which she spoke privately with her attorney presumably did not require the
protection of the privilege as a condition on disclosure.2 ° The basic waiver rule
conforms to this policy and provides for loss of the privilege whenever the client 2I
voluntarily discloses 22 a significant part23 of a privileged communication 21 to a third
person.25

the disclosure runs counter to the notion of confidentiality."); Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1434
(5th Cir. 1993) ("Patently, a voluntary disclosure of information which is inconsistent with the confidential nature
of the attorney client relationship waives the privilege."); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines,
951 F.2d 1414, 1423-24 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The privilege 'protects only those disclosures.. .which might not have
been made absent the privilege.' Accordingly, voluntary disclosure to a third party of purportedly privileged
communications has long been considered inconsistent with the privilege." (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391,403 (1976))); In re Pfohl Bros. Landfill Litig., 175 F.R.D. 13, 22 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Confidentiality is
an essential element of the privilege and divulging otherwise protected information to third parties destroys the
confidentiality of such communications and thus waives the privilege."); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109
F.R.D. 323, 327 (N.D. Cal. 1985) ("The confidentiality element and waiver are closely related inasmuch as any
voluntary disclosure inconsistent with the confidential nature of the attorney client relationship waives the
privilege.").
20. WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 2311, at 599 (justification for privilege "ceases when the client does not
appear to have been desirous of secrecy").
21. The disclosure must ordinarily be made by the client. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 341 F.3d 331,
336 (4th Cir. 2003) ("'The client is the holder of the attorney-client privilege and can waive it either expressly, or
through conduct."' (quoting Hawkins v. Stables, 148 F.3d 379, 384 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998))). Nevertheless, the attorney
can waive the privilege under traditional agency principles without regard to the client's knowledge or approval
of the attorney's action. See Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 636 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) ("While it is
a general rule that the privilege is personal to the client and may be voluntarily waived only by action of the client,
it is also clear that the client's attorney can be held to possess implied authority as an agent to effect a waiver
whether voluntary or inadvertent."); Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 460 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
("The nature of the trial process is such that an attorney, and not the client, must have the immediate and ultimate
responsibility of deciding if and when to raise objections.").
22. The disclosure must be voluntary. As such, a court-ordered disclosure, or one that occurs through
deception, does not result in waiver. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Short of courtcompelled disclosure or other equally extraordinary circumstances, we will not distinguish between various degrees
of 'voluntariness' in waivers of the attorney-client privilege."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley
& Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Minn. 1979) ("To the extent the documents can be viewed as stolen, following
the modem trend mentioned above, they should not lose the protection of the privilege."); In re Reorganization of
Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 681 N.E.2d 838, 841 (Mass. 1997) ("While it may perhaps have been tolerable in the past
to penalize a client for failing to achieve secrecy, such a position has become outmoded in an era of sophisticated
eavesdropping and infiltration devices 'against which no easily available protection exists."' (quoting 2 WEINSTEIN,
BERGER & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 16, 503(b)[2], at 503-52)).
23. The disclosure must involve a significant part of the communication. As such, a client can be required
to testify regarding the facts necessary to prove the existence of the privilege, her retention of an attorney, and the
particular subjects about which she spoke with her attorney. She cannot be required, in contrast, to disclose the
communication itself. See 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supranote 18, § 5729, at 561-62 (1992).
24. The client must intend for the communication to remain confidential. As such, a communication
between attorney and client for which there was never any expectation of secrecy (because, for example, the client
intended that the communication would ultimately be disclosed to some third party) is not privileged. See United
States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871,875 (4th Cir. 1984) ("[1]f a client communicates information to his attorney
with the understanding that the information will be revealed to others, that information as well as 'the details
underlying the data which was to be published' will not enjoy the privilege." (quoting In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1984))); United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548, 551 (10th Cir. 1979)
("When a matter is communicated to the lawyer with the intention or understanding it is to be repeated to another,
the content of the statement is not within the privilege.").
25. See Centuori v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d 727, 729 (D. Ariz. 2004) ("Waiver by
voluntary disclosure 'need not be effectuated by words or accompanied by the litigant's subjective intent."'
(quoting Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715,719 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004))); Lifewise Master Funding v. Telebank, 206
F.R.D. 298, 303 (D. Utah 2002) ("This court has also drawn a distinction between inadvertent disclosure and
disclosure which was advertent and intended where the person making discovery was merely unaware of the legal
consequences or nature of the document produced. In the latter situation the party making production has fully
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The emphasis on voluntary disclosure explains several forms of implied waiver.2 6
The voluntary disclosure of a portion of a privileged communication results in
waiver as to the remainder of the communication;27 the voluntary disclosure of a
privileged communication to one adversary results in waiver as to all other
adversaries; 28 and the assertion of a claim or defense that relies on a privileged
communication
for its success results in waiver as to the communication thus placed
"at issue."29 In these situations, waiver is implied from voluntary action that reflects
indifference to confidentiality andpurposeful use of the communication for tactical
gain.3 ° But more importantly, the waiver-triggering event is typically preceded by
an attorney's analysis of the consequences of disclosure and ultimate
recommendation that doing so will better protect the client's interests. This is the
case, for example, when a corporation voluntarily discloses the results of an internal

waived the.. .privilege."). As such, the threshold for waiving an evidentiary privilege is lower than that for waiving
a constitutional right. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("A waiver [of the right to counsel] is
ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.").
26. The term "implied waiver" is used to describe situations in which a client does not expressly waive the
privilege but rather engages in conduct that "places the claimant in such a position, with reference to the evidence,
that it would be unfair and inconsistent to permit the retention of the privilege." WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 2388,
at 855. The sword-shield metaphor is frequently used to explain implied waiver: a litigant cannot disclose a portion
of a privileged communication as a "sword" to advance a claim or defense and then invoke the privilege as a
"shield" to prevent inquiry into the communication and others on the same subject. See Willy v. Admin. Review
Bd., 423 F.3d 483, 497 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[W]hen a party entitled to claim the attorney-client privilege uses
confidential information against his adversary (the sword), he implicitly waives its use protectively (the shield)
under that privilege."). "Were the law otherwise, the client could selectively disclose fragments helpful to its cause,
entomb other (unhelpful) fragments, and in that way kidnap the truth-seeking process." In re Keeper of the Records
(Grand Jury Subpoena Addressed to XYZ Corp.), 348 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2003).
27. See United States v. Workman, 138 F.3d 1261, 1263 (8th Cir. 1998) (defendant "cannot selectively
assert the privilege to block the introduction of information harmful to his case after introducing other aspects of
his conversations with [his attorney] for his own benefit"); United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir.
1991) ("A defendant may not use the privilege to prejudice his opponent's case or to disclose some selected
communications for self-serving purposes."); Int'l Paper Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 63 F.R.D. 88,92 (D. Del. 1974)
(disclosure of a portion of a communication resulted in waiver of entire communication: "It would be manifestly
unfair to allow Fibreboard to make factual assertions and then deny International an opportunity to uncover the
foundation for those assertions in order to contradict them.").
28. See Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("The client cannot be
permitted to pick and choose among his opponents, waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of
confidentiality to obstruct others... .The attorney-client privilege is not designed for such tactical employment.");
see also In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993) ("We agree that selective assertion of
privilege should not be merely another brush on an attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated to gain tactical or
strategic advantage.").
29. See Weizmann Inst. of Sci. v. Neschis, No. 00 Civ. 7850, 2004 WL 540480, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17,
2004) ("Attorney-client privilege may. also be impliedly waived or forfeited where a party makes assertions in the
litigation or asserts a claim that in fairness requires examination of protected communications." (internal quotations
omitted)); Mordesovitch v. Westfield Ins. Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 636, 641 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) ("A party waives the
attorney-client privilege by asserting claims or defenses that put his or her attorney's advice in issue. The classical
example is where an attorney is sued by a client for legal malpractice."); Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel &
Co., 581 F. Supp. 51, 53-54 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (defendant waived attorney-client privilege as to all opinions
provided by attorney when it raised reliance on certain of them as a defense to claim for willful patent
infringement).
30. In these situations, waiver includes the communication actually disclosed as well as all other
communications on the same subject. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (voluntary
disclosure of privileged documents to third party waives the privilege not only for the disclosed documents but "all
other communications relating to the same subject matter"); Weizmann, 2004 WL 540480, at *3 ("[Wlhere there
has been a prejudicial disclosure of some attorney-client communications, there may be a waiver of all
communications on the same subject.").
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investigation regarding perceived corporate misconduct to the SEC that is based, at
least in part, on privileged information even though doing so will likely require
disclosure in the inevitable securities fraud class action. The corporation's attorney
will recognize the risk, but nevertheless recommend disclosure because the benefit
of currying favor with a regulator (and reducing the risk of crippling civil or
criminal penalties) outweighs the cost of an enhanced fraud claim. It is also the case
when a client sues her former attorney for malpractice even though doing so will
allow the former attorney to disclose potentially embarrassing information about the
client to defend the claim. The successor attorney will identify the risk, but still
recommend proceeding when necessary to ensure that the client is made whole.
While evidentiary privileges can be waived without any intent to do so, most
implied waiver results from a conscious decision in this regard.
The waiver analysis is more complicated in connection with the mistaken
production of a privileged document. The disclosure is voluntary, but only in the
sense that it is volitional.3 The client (or more accurately her attorney) plainly
produced the document but would not have done so if she recognized its privileged
status. Nor does the client have any intention to use the document for tactical
gain-indeed, she would prefer to retain confidentiality and prevent her adversary
from using the document to its advantage. And the instrumental rationale for the
privilege is not undermined by disclosure: the client may have been unwilling to
share her story in the absence of the privilege and may have relied on the assurance
of confidentiality as a condition on disclosure, but nevertheless loses its protection
even though she has done nothing indicating indifference to confidentiality or a
willingness to abandon it. The common law of agency may supply an answer,3 2 but
it is entirely unsatisfactory when considered in relation to the purpose behind the
privilege. This situation is thus qualitatively different from that which obtains when
a client flippantly shares a privileged communication with a friend or purposefully
injects a communication into a case for tactical gain.33

31. See supranote 25.
32. The client is, of course, the principal and the attorney is, of course, the agent in connection with an
attorney-client relationship. See, e.g., Rogers v. The Marshal, 68 U.S. 644, 651 (1863) ("The attorney is the agent
of his client to conduct his suit to judgment...."). One consequence of this agency relationship is that the attorneyagent's mistaken production of a privileged document binds the client-principal without regard to the client's
awareness of the mistake or interest in waiving the privilege. See Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626,
636 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) ("While it is a general rule that the privilege is personal to the client and may be voluntarily
waived only by action of the client, it is also clear that the client's attorney can be held to possess implied authority
as an agent to effect a waiver whether voluntary or inadvertent."); Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D.
455, 460 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ("The nature of the trial process is such that an attorney, and not the client, must have
the immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to raise objections.").
33. Nor is mistaken production analogous to the failure to object to a question at deposition or trial, a failure
that traditionally results in waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1973)
("Gunner's failure to make a timely objection to Foulk's testimony constituted a waiver of the privilege.");
Perrignon, 77 F.R.D., at 459 (privilege waived at deposition when attorney failed to object before plaintiff
described her conversations with former in-house counsel). The decision to produce a document is typically made
by a junior attorney or paralegal that bills at a lower rate (thereby providing substantial cost-savings to clients in
connection with this labor-intensive activity) but who possesses a limited understanding of the facts of the case,
the privilege, or its application in the context of those facts. In contrast, the decision to object to a question at a
deposition is typically made by a more seasoned attorney who is fully familiar with the scope of the privilege and
the nature of the case. Moreover, the decision to produce is made in a time-sensitive environment in which
thousands of decisions must be made each day and in which fatigue (if not outright boredom) is a likely
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Because of these differences, the federal courts have struggled to establish a
single standard for answering the question of when mistaken production results in
waiver. 34 The three approaches developed thus far (typically referred to as the strict,
middle, and lenient approaches, respectively) emphasize some aspect of privilege
doctrine, or some aspect of the discovery process, to promote a preferred outcome.35
Unfortunately, they do not provide an ideal solution and each is subject to criticism
in one way or another. Perhaps the confluence of conflicting considerations
regarding the importance of confidentiality, the magnitude of contemporary
document discovery, and the ever present potential for mistake by the most careful
party-each of which will likely be evaluated differently by individual j udges based
upon their own experiences before appointment to the bench-ultimately prevents
universal agreement on any particular standard. In this environment, a rules-based
solution may be the only means to a uniform rule that establishes a consistent
standard upon which all litigants, in all judicial districts, can rely.36
II. THE THREE APPROACHES USED BY THE FEDERAL COURTS TO
RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF WAIVER FOLLOWING THE MISTAKEN
PRODUCTION OF A PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT
A. The Strict Approach
Under the strict approach, any disclosure of privileged information waives the
attorney-client privilege-meaning that the mistaken production of a single

consequence of the process, thus greatly increasing the potential for mistake. In contrast, the decision to object is
made in a highly controlled environment after detailed preparation that heightens the attorney's and client's
sensitivity to relevance and privilege issues, thus reducing the likelihood of'"foot fault" by either. In fact, a claimed
"mistake" in this context is usually more feigned than real-and typically follows a planned disclosure that goes
awry because the attorney failed properly to anticipate the manner in which the disclosure could be turned around
and used by an adversary to its advantage.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 37-96.
35. See, e.g., Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1483 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[C]ourts have generally followed one
of three distinct approaches to attorney-client privilege waiver based on inadvertent disclosures: (1)the lenient
approach, (2) the 'middle of the road approach'...and (3) the strict approach."); Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v.
Dhimantek, 476 F. Supp. 2d 913, 944 (N.D. 111. 2007) ("In determining whether there was a waiver, courts apply
one of three approaches: (1) a subjective approach; (2) an objective approach; and (3) a balancing test."); Evenflo
Co. v. Hantee Agents Ltd., No. 3-05-CV-346, 2006 WL 2945440, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2006) ("Three
approaches to inadvertent disclosure have been taken by federal courts.").
36. Several articles exist on the subject, the best of which is Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege:
Waiver and the Litigator,84 MICH. L. REV. 1605 (1986). See also Wesley M. Ayres, Attorney-Client Privilege:
The Necessity of Intent to Waive the Privilege in InadvertentDisclosure Cases, 18 PAC. L.J. 59 (1986); George
A. Davidson & William H. Voth, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 64 OR. L. REV. 637 (1986); Shawn T.
Gaither, The Attorney-Client Privilege:An Analysis of Involuntary Waiver, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 311 (2000);
James M. Grippando, Attorney-Client Privilege:Implied Waiver Through InadvertentDisclosureof Documents,
39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1985); Roberta M. Harding, Waiver: A ComprehensiveAnalysis of a Consequence of
InadvertentlyProducingDocuments Protectedby the Attorney-Client Privilege,42 CATH. U. L. REV. 465 (1993);
Alan J. Meese, Inadvertent Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilegeby Disclosure of Documents: An Economic
Analysis, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 513 (1990); Audrey Rogers, New Insights on Waiver and the Inadvertent
Disclosure of PrivilegedMaterials:Attorney Responsibility as the Governing Precept, 47 FLA. L. REV. 159
(1995); Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 82 MICH. L. REv.
598 (1983); Ken M. Zeider, Note, InadvertentDisclosureand the Attorney-ClientPrivilege: Looking to the Work
ProductDoctrinefor Guidance, 22 CARDOzo L. REV. 1315 (2001).
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document, in a production comprised of thousands of documents, results in waiver37
without regard to the efforts taken to avoid disclosure.38 This approach is especially
harsh because waiver typically extends beyond the pertinent document to all other
communications on the same subject. 39 This approach is justified on the ground that

37. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("We.. .agree with those courts that the
privilege is lost even if the disclosure is inadvertent." (internal quotations omitted)); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Johnson, No.
Civ.A.00-2855, 2006 WL 2616187, at *18 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2006) ("[A] privilege holder's inadvertent disclosure
of privileged materials will effect a waiver...."); United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am.,
No. Civ. 99-3298,2004 WL 2009417, at *1 (D.D.C. May 17, 2004) ("Despite the importance of the attorney-client
privilege, it is not absolute and may be waived through inadvertent disclosure."); New York v. Microsoft Corp.,
No. Civ. A 98-1233, 2002 WL 649492, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 8,2002) ("Disclosure of otherwise-privileged materials,
even where the disclosure was inadvertent, serves as a waiver of the privilege."); Harmony Gold U.S.A., Inc., v.
FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113, 117 (N.D. IlI. 1996) ("[T]his court chooses to follow the objective approach since
we believe it to be a more realistic, as well as practical, means to resolve the problem and issues inherent in the
nature and circumstances of an inadvertent disclosure. Under the objective approach it would be an exercise in
futility to examine the intentions of the disclosing party...."); Wichita Land & Cattle Co. v. Am. Fed. Bank, F.S.B.,
148 F.R.D. 456,457 (D.D.C. 1992) ("Disclosure of otherwise-privileged materials, even where inadvertent, serves
as a waiver of the privilege."); Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Am. Bus. Lists, Inc., No. 1:90-CV-149, 1992
WL 338392, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 1992) ("Both inadvertent and deliberate disclosure of privileged
communications waives the privilege."); F.D.I.C. v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992) ("[Wlhen a
document is disclosed, even inadvertently, it is no longer held in confidence despite the intentions of the party and
thus, the privilege is lost even if the disclosure is inadvertent." (internal quotations omitted)); Western Trails, Inc.
v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 4, 8 (D.D.C. 1991) ("Even inadvertent disclosure, 'short of courtcompelled disclosure...,' waives the privilege...." (quoting In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980)); Golden Valley
Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 204, 209 (N.D. Ind. 1990) ("When 'inadvertent'
disclosure occurs the court should not be consumed in searching for the true intention of the disclosing party nor
should it utilize its crystal clear hindsight to determine the adequacy of the precautions taken."); ICI Ams. Inc. v.
Wanamaker, Civ. A No. 88-1346, 1989 WL 38647, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 1989) ("Once the document was
produced for inspection, it entered the public domain. Its confidentiality was breached thereby destroying the basis
for the continued existence ofthe privilege."); Int'l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445,449
(D. Mass. 1988) ("When confidentiality is lost through 'inadvertent' disclosure, the Court should not look at the
intention of the disclosing party. It follows that the Court should not examine the adequacy of the precautions taken
to avoid 'inadvertent' disclosure either." (citation omitted)); Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Prods., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 237,
243 (W.D.N.C. 1987) ("Voluntary production, even where inadvertent, effects a waiver of the privilege.");
Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970) ("The Court will not look
behind this objective fact [of production] to determine whether the plaintiff really intended to have the letter
examined.").
38. These courts contend that disclosure demonstrates that the precautions were inadequate: "It seems
somehow fictional to confirm the adequacy of the discovery precautions taken when obviously (as manifested by
the disclosure) the precautions, almost by definition, were inadequate." Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v.
Weaver Popcorn Co., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 204, 209 n.9 (N.D. Ind. 1990); see also Harmony Gold U.S.A., Inc., v.
FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113, 117 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
39. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (production of one privileged
memorandum resulted in subject matter waiver); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Johnson, No. Civ.A.00-2855, 2006 WL
2616187, at * 18 (D.D.C. Sept. 12,2006); United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., No. Civ.
99-3298, 2004 WL 2009417, at *1 (D.D.C. May 17, 2004); Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Am. Bus. Lists,
Inc., No. 1:90 CV 149, 1992 WL 338392, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 1992); Western Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to
Coast, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 4, 9 (D.D.C. 1991) ("[W]aiver extends 'to all other communications relating to the same
subject matter."' (quoting In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980-81)). But see Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc.
v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 208 (N.D. Ind. 1990) ("[Tlhe court could find no cases where
unintentional or inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents resulted in the wholesale waiver of the attorneyclient privilege as to undisclosed documents concerning the same subject matter."); ICI Ams. Inc. v. Wanamaker,
No. Civ. A 88-1346, 1989 WL 38647, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 1989) ("The production of these four documents was truly
an inadvertent mistake and the interests ofjustice therefore require the court to limit the damage done to the client.
Defendant's request for further production is consequently denied."); Int'l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 446 n.l (D. Mass. 1988) ("DEC claims that the disclosure operated not only as a waiver
of the documents actually disclosed but also as to undisclosed documents otherwise subject to the privilege but
which bear on the same subject matter. I rejected DEC's claim....").
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it disciplines parties, inducing them to protect the privilege zealously (with one
appellate court suggesting that privileged documents should be treated "like
jewels-if not crown jewels")4 ° and comports with the practical reality that
confidentiality can never be fully restored following disclosure.41 These
justifications are not persuasive, however.
First, the strict approach is unrealistic and can lead to waiver even when a litigant
treats its documents like "crown jewels." IBM's antitrust battles during the 1970s
demonstrate this point.42 IBM established an elaborate review process, with multiple
layers of attorney review, in an attempt to prevent the production of privileged
documents in the context of accelerated discovery.4 3 Even this process-recounted
with awe in judicial opinions and legal texts4-was not foolproof. IBM mistakenly
produced 1,200 pages of privileged material in a production totaling seventeen
million pages (or .007 percent of the total production) yet one district court still
found that the privilege had been waived and that this waiver extended to all other
communications on the same subject. 45 IBM treated its documents like "crown
jewels" but still came up short.46 There is no reason to think other litigants would

40. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976,980 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See generallyF.D.I.C. v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252,
253 (D. Me. 1992).
41. See Harmony Gold U.S.A., Inc. v. FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113, 117 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Wichita Land
& Cattle Co. v. Am. Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 148 F.R.D. 456, 459 (D.D.C. 1992); F.D.I.C. v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252,
253 (D. Me. 1992); Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204,209 (N.D. Ind.
1990); ICI Ams. Inc. v. Wanamaker, No. Civ. A 88-1346, 1989 WL 38647, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 1989); Int'l
Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445,449-50 (D. Mass. 1988); Underwater Storage, Inc. v.
U.S. Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970).
42. For a colorful description of the magnitude of IBM's effort in these cases, see JAMES B. STEWART, THE
PARTNERS: INSIDE AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL LAW FIRMS 53-113 (1983).

43. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 1978) (describing the
procedures taken by IBM to avoid production and characterizing the task as "monumental"). The Ninth Circuit
ultimately concluded that production of seventeen million pages of documents during a three-month period
pursuant to a court-imposed accelerated discovery program constituted "compelled" disclosure from which there
could not be any waiver. Id. at 651. As such, the Ninth Circuit did not address "whether... 'inadvertent' disclosure
constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege." Id. at 650.
44. Id. at 648 ("IBM mounted a herculean effort to review and produce the material which had been
requested."); IBM Corp. v. United States, 471 F.2d 507,523 (2d Cir. 1972) (Mulligan, J., dissenting) ("It is indeed
mind-boggling to contemplate 17 million document pages which in bulk weigh 87 tons and would stretch from
coast to coast. Even with the sophistication and expertise which this appellant brings to the task of document
production, to say nothing of the legal forces it commands, error is inevitable... Monopolist or not, IBM is hardly
infallible."); George A. Davidson & William H. Voth, supra note 36, at 642-43; Richard L. Marcus, supranote
36, at 1609-10.
45. See United States v. IBM Corp., No. 69 Civ. 200, 1972 WL 666, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1972),
vacated, 471 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1972).
46. The cost associated with document discovery is significant. One forensic consultant estimates that
review for privilege costs two dollars per page. KPMG FORENSIC, A REVOLUTION IN E-DIsCOVERY: THE
PERSUASIVE

ECONOMICS

OF

THE

DOCUMENT

ANALYTIC

APPROACH

8,

available at

http://www.reedsmith.coml_dbLdocumentslO5O17_eDiscWPvlO_POST.pdf. This consultant assumes the
reviewing attorney bills at $200 per hour and can review one hundred pages per hour. Id. Although the assumed
rate seems reasonable, the pace seems slow. A more realistic pace of 200 pages per hour (or approximately one box
per day) still results in a cost of one dollar per page for pre-production review. A client would therefore pay the
same amount to have an attorney review a modest-sized production of 32,000 pages ($200 per hour times ten hours
per day times sixteen days equals $32,000) as she would to have her attorney conduct a ten-day jury trial while
working an additional nine hours each evening to prepare for the next day's proceeding ($200 per hour times
sixteen hours per day times ten days equals $32,000). A client who is willing to pay this sort of money for
document review plainly treats her materials like "crown jewels" and should receive greater protection in the event
a privileged document slips through the cracks. Although readers can make different assumptions about the
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fare any better.4 7
Second, the strict approach incorrectly assumes that there is not a meaningful
corrective for lost confidentiality.4" While one cannot "unring a bell," the simple
remedy of returning the pertinent document is frequently adequate and entirely
consistent with other instances in which information is shared during discovery that
cannot ultimately be used at trial (such as evidence regarding subsequent remedial
measures, the existence and amount of insurance, and most hearsay statements).4 9
Moreover, litigants increasingly stipulate to this corrective in complex, documentintensive cases, 50 thereby tacitly acknowledging that reclaiming a mistakenly

applicable speed and hourly rate, the point remains the same: the cost associated with pre-production document
review is tremendous in an absolute sense and also in relation to more important pretrial and trial activities. Cf.
Deborah H. Juhnke, Where LitigationSupport Ends and ElectronicDiscovery Begins 8 (estimating by-hand review
costs of 660 per page, assuming review performed by contract attorney at $100 per hour and at a rate of 150 pages
per hour) (on file with the New Mexico Law Review). Not surprisingly, two commentators emphasize the cost
associated with preserving the privilege in connection with their calls for change. Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client
Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 861 (1998) (A
requirement of confidentiality "should be abandoned as a requirement for the attorney-client privilege because
compliance with it generates significant unnecessary costs in the preservation of secrecy, the proof of that
preservation, and the resolution of disputes surrounding it."); Alan J. Meese, supra note 36 (advocating a lenient
approach to avoid the "wasteful" costs associated with pre-production review). And, of course, litigants themselves
frequently raise the cost of review to justify limitations on the scope of document discovery or to shift the cost of
that discovery to the requesting party. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 216 F.R.D. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (defendant requested that court require plaintiff to pay for restoring and producing e-mails stored on back-up
tapes and estimated that the work would cost $165,954.67 to restore and search the tapes and an additional
$107,694.72 for attorney and paralegal review); Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D.
421,425 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("By using paralegals to review the production at the rate of two e-mails per minute at
fees of $150 per hour, it is estimated that the privilege analysis would cost approximately $247,000.").
47. The volume of documents produced in civil actions is truly remarkable, making the sort of perfection
required by the strict approach unachievable in most cases. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescrip. Drugs Antitrust
Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 614 (7th Cir. 1997) (fifty-million pages); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1355,
2003 WL 22023398, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 11, 2003) (seven-million pages); In re VISA Check/Mastermoney
Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503,511 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (five-million pages); United States v. Duke Energy
Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 622 (M.D.N.C. 2003), vacated, Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp. __ U.S. -, 127
S.Ct 1423 (2007) (4.6 million pages); Bussie v. Allmerica Fin. Corp., 50 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D. Mass. 1999)
(three-million pages).
48. Harmony Gold U.S.A., Inc. v. FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113, 117 (N.D. IIl. 1996) ("With the loss of
confidentiality to the disclosed documents, there is little this court could offer the disclosing party to salvage its
compromised position."); F.D.I.C. v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992) ("Once persons not within the
ambit of the confidential relationship have knowledge of the communication, that knowledge cannot be undone.
One cannot 'unring' a bell."); Int'l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445,449 (D. Mass. 1988)
("[Riegardless of how painstaking the precautions, there is no order I can enter which erases from defendant's
counsel's knowledge what has been disclosed... Plaintiff suggests that a protective order be issued prohibiting the
defendant from 'using' the documents, a sort of 'use immunity.' I reject the suggestion because I do not see what
purpose would be served. Such an order would not restore the confidential nature of the document.").
49. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that
is relevant to the claim or defense of any party... Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."); FED. R. Evt). 407
(evidence of subsequent remedial measures); id.411 (evidence of liability insurance); id. 801 (hearsay statements).
50. For a form of protective order regarding the inadvertent production of privileged documents and the
return of such documents, see Hewlett v. Hewlett-PackardCo., No. 19513-NC, 2002 WL 32151538 (Del. Ch. Ct.
Apr. 16, 2002). Two commentators argue that "[t]he single reform of giving effect, in subsequent litigation, to a
stipulation or order providing that inadvertent production will not constitute a waiver, would greatly simplify the
task of resolving privilege claims." Davidson & Voth, supra note 36, at 655. Such reform, however, would likely
be effective in two-way discovery cases in which both sides possess sizable quantities of discoverable documents,
are equally at risk of making a mistake and losing the protection, and are thus equally motivated to enter into such
an agreement. The same is not true, however, in one-sided discovery cases where one party possesses all or the vast
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produced document is adequate to protect their interests. The courts should not
ignore this real world prophylactic and assume that complete relief is a necessary
condition for any relief."
Third, the strict approach may cause litigants who possess substantial quantities
of discoverable documents (but who do not possess corresponding resources) to
forego the protection of the privilege simply to avoid the cost of document review
when the governing standard requires, but their attorneys cannot assure, that all
privileged documents will be isolated and withheld for purposes of preserving the
privilege. While IBM may have been willing to devote unlimited resources to avoid
disclosure in litigation threatening the continued existence of the corporation in its
then-current form, the same cannot be said of smaller corporate litigants in gardenvariety employment disputes involving pattern and practice allegations that purport
to justify discovery of documents from personnel files and e-mail accounts of other
employees and other employment decisions. The cost associated with document
review, when coupled with the absence of assurance that the privilege will be
preserved, may cause these litigants to forego document review altogether. A
litigant's ability to retain the benefits of the privilege should not, however, ebb and
flow with its financial capacity and ability-but that is an unfortunate consequence
of the decision-making process for litigants in jurisdictions that follow the strict
approach.
Finally, the strict approach does not promote the policy underlying the privilege.
A client's reliance on the privilege as a condition on disclosure should not be lost
because her attorney makes a mistake months (if not years) later during discovery
in a civil case that may not have been foreseeable at the time the communication
occurred. 2 The client has done nothing suggesting indifference to confidentiality,

majority of all the discoverable documents and the other party does not want to give up the leverage that may attach
to the production of these documents and the potential loss of the privilege if a document is mistakenly produced.
51. Such agreements are enforceable against parties only. See 8 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2016.2, at 240 (2d ed. 1994) ("But such
orders or agreements are not sufficient to withstand customary waiver analysis; whatever their estoppel effect as
to the parties involved they could not bind nonparties."); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the
Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1427 (3d Cir. 1991) (DOJ's agreement that it would not disclose privileged
communications shared by Westinghouse could not bind nonparties); Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D.
228, 235 (D. Md. 2005) ("Some commentators appear to be openly skeptical of their ability to insulate the parties
from waiver, and even if they are enforceable as between the parties that enter into them, it is questionable whether
they are effective against third-parties."); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Guide Corp., 206 F.R.D. 249, 250 (S.D. Ind.
2001) ("[W]hile the parties might bind themselves by agreeing to limit waivers of privileges and protections, their
agreement cannot bind third parties."). Sometimes these agreements are not even enforceable as between the parties
themselves. See IBM Corp. v. United States, 471 F.2d 507, 517 (2d Cir. 1972) (court refused to enforce agreement
between parties), appeal dismissed, 480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973); Koch Materials Co. v. Shore Slurry Seal, Inc.,
208 F.R.D. 109, 118 (D.N.J. 2002) (trial court refused to enforce agreement between parties prohibiting claims of
waiver with respect to mistakenly produced documents because such an agreement "could lead to sloppy attorney
review and improper disclosure which could jeopardize clients' cases"); In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.,
192 F.R.D. 575,577-79 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (trial court refused to enforce agreement that production of documents
did not constitute waiver of privilege).
52. As noted previously, the attorney-client privilege encourages "full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration ofjustice." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). As such, clients will frequently
consult with their attorneys before taking action to verify that the contemplated action is consistent with the law.
A manufacturer of popular computer hardware may, for example, consult with an attorney before making changes
to its products that could affect the compatibility of other vendors' existing products. This discussion will likely
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and a potential malpractice claim is hardly an adequate remedy-a second round of
litigation, solely for the purpose of trying the hypothetical case-within-a-case in
which the privileged information is excluded, seems entirely wasteful when a far
simpler corrective exists.53
B. The Middle Approach
Under the middle approach, the mistaken production of a privileged document
may or may not result in waiver depending upon the facts and circumstances of the
case.54 This approach acknowledges the potential for mistake in document-intensive
litigation and attempts to protect those litigants who make a good faith effort to
preserve confidentiality while punishing those litigants who handle their documents
with "such extreme carelessness as to suggest that [they are] not concerned with the
protection of the asserted privilege."55 To distinguish between these two categories

precede, by a substantial period, any ultimate change in the product and, by an even more substantial period, a civil
action by one of the other vendors for alleged violation of the antitrust laws.
53. The D.C. Circuit justifies the strict approach on the additional ground that it limits the ability of
organizations to insulate documents from discovery. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
This court reasons that increases in the frequency with which organizations label documents "privileged"
necessarily increases the likelihood that a privileged document will be produced during discovery. Id. From this,
the court concludes that the strict approach will cause these organizations to limit the number of documents labeled
"privileged" to eliminate the mistakes it might otherwise make during discovery to protect the privilege. Id. This
justification makes no sense. A document's privileged status does not depend upon the label attached by an author,
and waiver does not occur merely because a document so labeled is produced in discovery if it does not meet the
requirements of the privilege. See Baptiste v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 2102, 2004 WL 330235,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2004) ("' [T1he determination of whether a document is privileged does not depend upon
the technical requirement of a privilege legend.' (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. M- 11-189, 2001 WL
1167497, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2001))); Lifewise Master Funding v. Telebank, 206 F.R.D. 298,301 (D. Utah
2002) ("It is not necessary that a document be labeled as privileged in order for it to be subject to an
Attorney/Client or work product privilege if the document otherwise fits within such privilege. On the other hand,
labeling a document as privileged does not meet the privilege claimants' burden of establishing the privilege
claim."). Perhaps because of this defect, the artificial expansion justification has only been invoked two other times
to justify the strict approach. See Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Am. Bus. Lists, Inc., Civ. No. 1:90-CV-149JEC, 1992 WL 338392, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 1992); Western Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 139
F.R.D. 4, 8-9 (D.D.C. 1991).
54. See, e.g., Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993) ("in our view, an analysis
which permits the court to consider the circumstances surrounding a disclosure on a case-by-case basis is preferable
to aperse rule of waiver."); United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, 242 F.R.D. 491,494 (N.D. 111.2007) ("[Tlhe
Court will apply a balancing test, which provides maximum flexibility based on the individual facts of any case.");
Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 476 F. Supp. 2d 913, 944-45 (N.D. 111.2007)
("Because of the unique circumstances of the current case and in recognition of the fact that circumstances may
not always warrant disregarding privilege, even in cases of inadvertent disclosure, this Court opts to follow the
balancing approach."); Urban Outfitters, Inc. v. DPIC Cos., 203 F.R.D. 376,380 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("The Court finds
that the balancing test is the most appropriate method for assessing whether waiver occurred."); Simon Prop. Group
L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 644,648 (S.D. Ind. 2000) ("[Tlhis court adopts the balancing approach."); SnapOn Inc. v. Hunter Eng'g Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (E.D. Wis. 1998) ("Although district courts within the
seventh circuit have used all three approaches, the 'emerging trend' is to use the balancing test."); Briggs &
Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 176 F.R.D. 695, 699 (M.D. Ga. 1997) ("The case-by-case approach is
the better approach and will be adopted in this court."); Edwards v. Whitaker, 868 F. Supp. 226, 229 (M.D. Tenn.
1994) ('This Court believes that the [middle] approach is most fair and appropriate.").
55. Lloyds Bank PLC v. Republic of Ecuador, No. 96 Civ. 1789 DC, 1997 WL96591, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
5, 1997); see also Trudeau v. N.Y. State Consumer Prot. Bd., 237 F.R.D. 325, 339 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Inadvertent
production will not waive the privilege unless the conduct of the producing party or its counsel evinced such
extreme carelessness as to suggest that it was not concerned with the protection of the privilege."); Hawkins v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-688, 2006 WL 3230756, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 19, 2006) ("[G]iven the number
ofdocuments which are typically produced in litigation, even the most diligent of parties will occasionally produce
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of litigants (and ultimately to determine whether there has been a waiver), courts
typically consider five factors: the reasonableness of the precautions taken to
prevent disclosure, the number of mistakenly produced documents, the extent of the
disclosure, the time taken to correct the mistake once it comes to light, and whether
justice and fairness would be served by relieving a party from its mistake.56 This
approach seeks fair and equitable results, but in so doing exacts a high price
because of the detailed factual inquiry into the document-handling practices of the
producing party.5 7 And, while the "extreme carelessness" language implies a
relatively modest threshold for preserving the privilege, the courts are frequently
more exacting in their assessment of what should be expected from the producing
party 5 8 -thus leading to additional uncertainty in the application of an already
uncertain facts and circumstances test.
1. Reasonableness of Efforts to Avoid Disclosure
The courts consider the efforts taken by the producing party to avoid disclosure
and ordinarily find them sufficient so long as there is evidence establishing that the
documents were reviewed on a page-by-page basis by an attorney or paralegal prior
to production.59 Because there is usually some form of pre-production review in

a privileged document inadvertently, and it ignores the realities of a discovery process to conclude that such a
production is always a waiver of the attorney-client privilege....").
56. See Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 50
(M.D.N.C. 1987).
57. See Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1484 (8th Cir. 1996). These costs are not insignificant: a producing
party who learns of a mistake must prepare a motion for a protective order, together with a supporting
memorandum and affidavits, and can easily incur $25,000 in legal fees and costs in so doing. A party opposing
such a motion can incur the same fees and costs (and sometimes more if it conducts follow-up discovery in an
attempt to challenge the content of the producing party's affidavits). These fees and costs are largely unavoidable
because nearly any position regarding waiver is supportable given the facts and circumstances standard that will
resolve the issue, thereby increasing the potential for expensive post-production motion practice.
58. See infra notes 63, 65.
59. See, e.g., Expert Choice, Inc. v. Gartner, Inc., No. 3:03 CV 022234, 2007 WL 951662, at *3 (D. Conn.
Mar. 27, 2007) (same attorney reviewed each page of each document prior to production); Pucket v. Hot Springs
Sch. Dist. No. 23-2, 239 F.R.D. 572, 586 (D.S.D. 2006) ("The court finds that this review of the file by both an
attorney and paralegal to remove privileged material is a reasonable precaution."); United States v. Mallinckrodt,
Inc., 227 F.R.D. 295, 298 (E.D. Mo. 2005) ("USA did engage in a privilege review, which this Court finds to be
a reasonable manner of protecting privileged documents from disclosure."); Stoner v. N.Y. City Ballet Co., No.
99 Civ. 0196, 2002 WL 31875404, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24,2002) (attorney reviewed documents and tagged
those that were privileged; copy service removed tags and copied all documents; "while flawed in hindsight," the
precautions "were not self-evidently unreasonable at the time"); Fleet Bus. Credit Corp. v. Hill City Oil Co., No.
01-02417 MAV, 2002 WL 31741282, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2002) (team of three attorneys and paralegal
reviewed each document, isolated privileged documents and tagged remainder with tabs indicating they were to
be copied); Purizer Corp. v. Battelle Mem'l Inst., No. 01 C 6360,2002 WL 1400263, at *2 (N.D. I11.
June 27, 2002)
(precautions were adequate where experienced attorneys and legal assistants performed review after receiving
instructions from lead counsel regarding how to search for privileged documents); Lifewise Master Funding v.
Telebank, 206 F.R.D. 298,303 (D. Utah 2002) (initial disclosure "preceded by careful segregation of documents");
United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 179 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (documents were initially
reviewed by paralegals and secretaries; those that appeared privileged were then reviewed by in-house attorneys;
"[plunishing defendant foradopting this common, reasonable, and cost-effective strategy would not make sense");
Starway v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 187 F.R.D. 595, 597 (D. Minn. 1999) (review "was not casually placed in
the hands of not-lawyer staff, and the precautions taken in this case were reasonable"); Laquila Constr., Inc. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., No. 98 CIV. 5920 HB,1999 WL 232901, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1999) (single attorney
reviewed file and removed pages that appeared to be privileged; court characterized this as "reasonable
procedure-albeit not a particularly sophisticated one"); Baker's Aid, a Div. of M. Raubvogel Co. v. Hussman
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civil cases, this factor usually tips in favor of preserving the privilege.' Indeed,
there are few cases in which a court found the producing party's efforts inadequate
in the face of testimony that such review occurred.6 In contrast, this factor tips in
favor of waiver when the producing party fails to perform any review prior to
production (or at least fails to submit evidence from which the court can make a
finding in this regard).6 2

Foodservice Co., No. CV 87-0937, 1988 WL 138254, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1988) (review by attorney followed
by instruction to defendant's employee not to produce privileged document); Wallace v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 179
F.R.D. 313, 314 (D. Kan. 1998) (review by attorney and experienced legal assistant was adequate even though they
missed privileged document marked as such); Prescient Partners, L.P. v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., No. 96 CIV. 7590,
1997 WL 736726, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1997) (attorney reviewed documents and identified those that were
privileged, delegating responsibility to paralegal to remove designated documents and conform copies); Aramony
v. United Way of Am., 969 F. Supp. 226, 236-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (initial review for privilege by paralegals and
junior associate, followed by review of documents identified as potentially privileged by senior associate, deemed
adequate); Lloyds Bank PLC v. Republic ofEcuador, No. 96 Civ. 1789 DC, 1997 WL 9659 1, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
5, 1997) (review for privilege by two associates was adequate); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse)
S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437,445 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (review by attorneys with paralegals then physically pulling privileged
documents from the population); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276, 279-80 (M.D.N.C. 1992) (initial
review for privilege byjunior attorney and paralegal, followed by review of those identified as potentially privileged
by a more senior attorney, followed by review ofsample of documents designated for production deemed adequate);
F.D.I.C. v. Ernst & Whinney, 137 F.R.D. 14, 17 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) (producing party "followed quite extensive
precautions to avoid disclosure ofprivileged materials"); Monarch Cement Co. v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 132 F.R.D.
558, 560 (D. Kan. 1990) (producing party's representation that counsel was diligent in efforts to review each
document was sufficient to support finding of adequate precautions); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Pittsburgh
& Midway Coal Mining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171, 172 (D. Kan. 1989) (producing party's representation that counsel
diligently attempted to review each document and segregate those that were privileged was sufficient to support
finding of adequate precautions).
60. United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 179 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("The reasonableness
of the precautions adopted by the producing party must be viewed principally from the standpoint of customary
practice in the legal profession at the time and in the location of the production, not with the 20-20 vision of
hindsight.").
61. See Trudeau v. N.Y. State Consumer Prot. Bd., 237 F.R.D. 325,343-44 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (court drew
inference that producing party's efforts to avoid disclosure were inadequate due to production of four copies of an
obviously privileged document); Atronic Int'l, GMBH v. SAI Semispecialists of Am., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 160, 164
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (producing party's efforts to avoid disclosure of privileged documents were inadequate because
"the attorney assigned to review these documents did not know the identity of plaintiff's legal counsel in this
matter"); Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., No. M18-302, 931745, 2003 WL 289640, at * 14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11,
2003) (producing party's efforts to avoid disclosure were inadequate because "the Bank's handling of privilege
claims [was] plagued by continuing confusion and a lack of clarity"); Koch Materials Co. v. Shore Slurry Seal, Inc.,
208 F.R.D. 109, 119 (D.N.J. 2002) (producing party's efforts to avoid disclosure were inadequate, even though
all documents were reviewed twice before production, because plaintiff failed to determ;ne the author of what
turned out to be privileged handwritten marginalia on several of them); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F.
Supp. 404, 412-13 (D.N.J. 1995) (purported reliance on prior counsel's representation that documents had been
reviewed was not adequate); In re Sause Bros. Ocean Towing, 144 F.R.D. 111, 115 (D. Or. 1991) (employment
of paralegal services firm to conduct privilege review was "only marginally reasonable"); F.D.I.C. v. Marine
Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 483 (E.D. Va. 1991) (review by two attorneys for one day of
approximately 15,000 to 50,000 pages was "manifestly inadequate" because it "created an unnecessarily high
potential for an inadvertent disclosure").
62. See Herndon v. U.S. Bancorp Asset Mgmt., Inc., No. 4:05CV 01446 ERW, 2007 WL 781788, at *3-4
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 13, 2007) (defendant acknowledged that it did not review document prior to delivery to plaintiff);
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., No. IP96-1718-C-H/G, 2001 WL 699850, at * 1-2 (S.D. Ind. May
29, 2001) (plaintiff incorrectly assumed that documents had been reviewed for privilege by attorney who left firm
and therefore did not perform any review; in the absence of an agreed-upon protective order, court would have
found waiver due to insufficient safeguards); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 412 (D.N.J.
1995) (defendants admitted that they did not conduct any review prior to production of documents, claiming it
assumed the review had been done by prior counsel; defendants' pre-production efforts were thus inadequate);
Graco Children's Prods., Inc. v. Dressler, Goldsmith, Shore & Milnamow, Ltd., No. 95 C 1303, 1995 WL 360590,
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Several district courts depart from this pattern when the producing party reviews
the documents prior to inspection by an adverse party but then fails to review them
a second time prior to delivery of those selected for production. These courts justify
a finding of waiver on the ground that a second review may have prevented the
disclosure.6 3 Other district courts, however, reject the need for additional review
prior to formal production.64 (One district court ironically concluded that the
producing party's second review [during which it caught all of its earlier mistakes]
was too little, too late. 65)

at *8 (N.D. 111.June 14, 1995) (no precautionary measures prior to production); Cunningham v. Conn. Mut. Life
Ins., 845 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (plaintiff failed to review documents produced by former attorney
from other litigation and therefore did not take adequate precautions to avoid disclosure); Allen-Bradley Co. v.
Autotech Corp., No. 86 C 8514, 1989 WL 134500, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 1989) (plaintiff did not review
documents prior to making them available for inspection); see also Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 02
C 3283, 2003 WL 22839808, at *3 (N.D. 111.Nov. 26, 2003) (defendant failed to provide any evidence regarding
precautions that were taken to prevent disclosure). A party that does not provide any evidence regarding preproduction review can occasionally avoid a finding of waiver so long as it acted promptly upon learning that it
made a mistake. See Myers v. City of Highland Village, 212 F.R.D. 324, 327 (E.D. Tex. 2003) (defendant did not
waive privilege even though it failed to "establish[] that it took any precautions to prevent the disclosure of the
document"); In re Atl. Fin. Fed. Sec. Litig., No. 89-645, 1992 WL 50074, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 1992) (court did
not find waiver notwithstanding the fact that defendant "offered no evidence upon which the court can assess the
reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure.").
63. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 292 (D. Mass. 2000) (producing
party's efforts were inadequate because, although its attorneys reviewed all documents prior to production and
segregated the privileged ones from the others, the attorneys failed to review the documents a second time after they
were returned from the copy service hired to photocopy the responsive documents and thus did not discover that
the copy service copied both categories of documents); F.C. Cycles Int'l, Inc. v. Fila Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64,
77-78 (D. Md. 1998) (producing party did not take adequate steps to avoid disclosure because, while its attorneys
reviewed the documents prior to making them available for inspection, it did not again review the documents after
they were designated for production to verify that they did not contain privileged information); In re Sause Bros.
Ocean Towing, 144 F.R.D. 111, 115 (D. Or. 1991) (producing party failed to review documents a second time
following inspection to determine whether any designated documents were privileged); Bud Antle, Inc. v. GrowTech, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 183 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (producing party's efforts were inadequate because it missed
privileged document prior to inspection and then failed to review the documents thereafter designated for
production); Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 51 (M.D.N.C.
1987) (although the court found the producing party's pre-inspection review "commendable," it nevertheless
concluded that it was inadequate because the producing party did not perform a second review of the documents
designated for production following inspection); Liggett Group Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116
F.R.D. 205,207-08 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (attorney reviewed box of documents prior to production, separating them
into stacks for production and not for production; "counsel have not satisfied the Court that reasonable protective
measures were employed in order to safeguard claims of privilege" and "there is no indication that counsel reviewed
the relatively small number of documents selected for production after copying.. .had been completed."); see also
Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., Civil No. 03-1485, 2006 WL 1967364, at *4 (D.P.R. July 11, 2006)
(producing party's efforts were inadequate because, although it reviewed all documents prior to their placement
on a disk, it failed to review the disk prior to production and thus failed to learn that privileged documents that were
previously segregated were mistakenly included on the disk).
64. See United States v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 295, 298 n.5 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (rejecting argument
that plaintiff should have reviewed documents a second time after they were scanned onto CD-ROMs); Prescient
Partners, L.P. v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 7590, 1997 WL 736726, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1997)
(rejecting argument that documents should have been reviewed a second time because it would "needlessly increase
the costs of litigation"); Aramony v. United Way of Am., 969 F. Supp. 226, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (procedures were
adequate even though attorneys did not review documents second time following inspection and identification of
those designated for production); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 133
F.R.D. 171, 172 (D. Kan. 1989) (court rejected receiving party's contention that second screening would have
prevented disclosure; "[t]hrough hindsight one may conceive of further precautions that might have prevented an
inadvertent disclosure" but precautions taken were nevertheless adequate).
65. See Prebilt Corp. v. Preway, Inc., Civ. A No. 87-7132, 1988 WL 99713, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 23,
1988) (although plaintiff reviewed documents before inspection and pulled privileged documents and reviewed
them again after inspection and pulled privileged documents missed the first time, this was "not sufficient").
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These latter cases highlight the primary defect of the middle approach-the
potential for inconsistent results due to the inconsistent application of the various
factors. The outcome of a waiver dispute should not depend on the particular
manner in which documents are produced, yet the case law suggests that it
sometimes can. 66 A party making documents available for inspection, for example,
risks waiver if it does not review the documents a second time prior to delivery of
those selected for production, even when there is no evidence suggesting any
inadequacy in the initial review. Put simply, a party that reviewed its documents for
privilege prior to inspection would not have any reason to believe further review
would be necessary prior to delivery of those designated for production-yet some
courts conclude that such additional review is necessary to preserve the privilege.
Another defect is logistical: courts are ill-equipped to evaluate the thoroughness
of review based solely on self-serving testimony provided by the producing party.
A court obviously cannot know whether the individuals performing the review
(whether senior partners, junior associates, paralegals, or others) thoroughly
reviewed the documents or merely skimmed them when not attending to other
matters. Nor is there any way for the receiving party meaningfully to challenge the
producing party's testimony in this regard, and follow-up deposition discovery does
not provide a panacea given the cost associated with such an effort. Although this
factor goes to the heart of the middle approach, it is not very useful-as a practical
matter-in determining whether the privilege should be preserved or lost in a given
case.
2. Number of Inadvertent Disclosures
The courts also consider the number of documents mistakenly produced, usually
in relation to the total number of documents produced. This factor tips in favor of
preserving the privilege when the document production exceeds 1,000 pages67

66. See supra notes 63, 65.
67. See United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, No. 05 C 5140, 2007 WL 1518914 (N.D. 111.May 22,
2007) (privilege was not waived due to inadvertent production of one privileged e-mail and three hand-marked
documents in production totaling 22,000 documents); Expert Choice, Inc. v. Gartner, Inc., Civil No. 3:03 CV
02234, 2007 WL 951662 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2007) (privilege was not waived due to inadvertent production of
fourteen documents in production totaling 180,000 pages); Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger
Dhimantec, 476 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. ll. 2007) (privilege was not waived due to inadvertent production of single
document in production comprised of thirty to forty boxes of documents); Pucket v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No. 232, 239 F.R.D. 572 (D.S.D. 2006) (privilege was not waived due to inadvertent production of a thirteen-page
privileged document in production totaling more than 1,000 pages); United States v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 227 F.R.D.
295 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (privilege was not waived due to inadvertent production of single privileged memorandum
in production totaling 61,000 pages); Myers v. City of Highland Village, 212 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Tex. 2003) (fourpage privileged document in production totaling approximately 1,500 pages did not waive privilege); Stonerv. New
York City Ballet Co., No. 99-Civ.-0196, 2002 WL 31875404 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 2002) (fifteen privileged
documents in production totaling 1,000 pages did not waive privilege); Fleet Bus. Credit Corp. v. Hill City Oil Co.,
No. 01-02417, 2002 WL 31741282 (w.D. Tenn. Dec. 5,2002) (thirty pages of privileged documents in production
totaling 16,000 pages did not waive privilege); Purizer Corp. v. Battelle Mem'l Inst., No. 01 C 6360, 2002 WL
1400263 (N.D. M1.June 27, 2002) (twenty-six-page privileged document in production totaling 45,000 pages did
not waive privilege); United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (approximately
200 to 300 pages of privileged documents in production totaling 200,000 pages did not waive privilege); R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Premium Tobacco Stores, Inc., No. 99 C 1174, 2001 WL 1286727, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
24, 2001) (one page of privileged notes in production totaling "hundreds of thousands of documents" did not waive
privilege); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Servs. Co., No. 97 Civ. 6124, 2000 WL 744369, at *6
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(although sometimes smaller quantities qualify as sufficiently sizable to warrant an
assumption that mistakes will likely occur 68) and the number of pages of privileged
documents mistakenly produced is less than five percent of this total.6 9

(S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2000) ("less than forty documents" in production totaling 400,000 pages did not waive
privilege); Starway v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 187 F.R.D. 595 (D. Minn. 1999) (four-page privileged
memorandum in production totaling 541 pages did not waive privilege); Laquila Constr., Inc. v. Travelers Indem.
Co., No. 98 Civ. 5920, 1999 WL 232901 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1999) (one-page privileged document in production
totaling 400 pages did not waive privilege); Fry v. McCall, No. 95 Civ. 1915, 1998 WL 273035 (S.D.N.Y. May
28, 1998) (one-page privileged document in production totaling five cartons did not waive privilege); Wallace v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 179 F.R.D. 313 (D. Kan. 1998) (ten pages of privileged documents in production totaling
several hundred pages did not waive privilege); Int'l Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, Local 7-517 v. Uno-Ven Co.,
No. 97 C 2663, 1998 WL 100264 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 1998) (small number of privileged documents in production
totaling 6,000 pages did not waive privilege); Prescient Partners, L.P. v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 7590,
1997 WL 736726 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1997) (117 pages of privileged documents in production exceeding 12,000
pages did not waive privilege); Aramony v. United Way of Am., 969 F. Supp. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (ninety-nine
pages of privileged documents in production totaling 630,000 pages did not waive privilege); Lloyds Bank PLC
v. Republic of Ecuador, No. 96 Civ. 1789, 1997 WL 96591 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1997) (227 pages of privileged
documents in production totaling 10,000 pages did not waive privilege); Asian Vegetable Research & Dev. Ctr.
v. Inst. of Int'l Educ., No. 94 Civ. 6551, 1995 WL 491491 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1995) (twenty pages of privileged
documents in production totaling 75,000 pages did not waive privilege); H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc. v. William
Carter Co., No. 95 Civ. 1274, 1995 WL 301351, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995) (two-page privileged document
in "course of extensive, expedited discovery" did not waive privilege); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais
(Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("miniscule" number of privileged documents in production
totaling over 70,000 pages did not waive privilege); Bayer AG & Miles, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 92 Civ. 0381,
1994 WL 705331 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1994) (ten privileged documents in production totaling millions of pages did
not waive privilege); Martin v. Valley Nat'l Bank, No. 89 Civ. 8361, 1992 WL 196798 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1992)
(five-page privileged memorandum in production totaling "more than 50,000 pages" did not waive privilege); In
re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276 (M.D.N.C. 1992) (eighteen privileged documents in production
totaling 22,000 pages did not waive privilege); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, No. 87-C-8111, 1991 WL
105633 (N.D. II. June 7, 1991) (one document in production totaling 16,500 pages did not waive privilege);
F.D.I.C. v. Ernst & Whinney, 137 F.R.D. 14 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) (fourteen privileged documents in production
totaling 2.3 million pages did not waive privilege); Monarch Cement Co. v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 558
(D. Kan. 1990) (eight pages of privileged documents in production totaling 9,563 pages did not waive privilege);
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171 (D. Kan. 1989) (three
privileged documents in production totaling 500,000 pages did not waive privilege); Baker's Aid, a Div. of M.
Raubvogel Co. v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., No. CV 87 0937, 1988 WL 138254 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1988) (one
document in production totaling 5,000 documents did not waive privilege); Baltica-Skandinavia Ins. Co. v. Booth,
Potter, Seal & Co., No. 86-1967, 1987 WL 18588 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1987) (one document in production totaling
563 pages did not waive privilege); In re Wyoming Tight Sands Antitrust Cases, No. 85-2349-S, 1987 WL 93812
(D. Kan. Sept. 11, 1987) (small number of privileged documents in production totaling 1.5 million pages did not
waive privilege).
68. See Starway v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 187 F.R.D. 595 (D. Minn. 1999) (no waiver in connection
with production totaling 541 pages); Laquila Constr., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 98 Civ. 5920, 1999 WL
232901 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1999) (no waiver in connection with production of 400 pages); Wallace v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 179 F.R.D. 313 (D. Kan. 1998) (no waiver in connection with production of "several hundred
pages"); Baltica-Skandinavia Ins. Co. v. Booth, Potter, Seal & Co., No. 86-1967, 1987 WL 18588 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
14, 1987) (no waiver in connection with production totaling 563 pages).
69. See Hemandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., Civil No. 03-1485,2006 WL 1967364 (D.P.R. July 11, 2006)
(privilege waived because defendant produced 2,000 privileged documents); Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd.,
No. M 18-302,931745, 2003 WL 289640 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003) (privilege waived because defendant produced
nearly every document on its last privilege log); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287 (D.
Mass. 2000) (privilege waived because 3,821 pages of privileged documents were produced in production totaling
approximately 70,000 pages); Ray Larsen Assocs., Inc. v. Nikko Am., Inc., No. 89 Civ. 2809, 1993 WL 307905
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1993) (privilege waived because a one-page privileged document was produced in production
totaling twenty-nine pages); Graco Children's Prods., Inc. v. Dressier, Goldsmith, Shore & Milnamow, Ltd., No.
95 C 1303, 1995 WL 360590 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 1995) (privilege waived due to production of fifty-two privileged
documents in production totaling 700 documents); Liggett Group Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116
F.R.D. 205 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (privilege waived because "several dozen" of the documents in a single box of
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Nevertheless, a modest number of mistakes will not protect a litigant who does not
perform any review or who fails promptly to alert other parties of the mistake once
she becomes aware of it.7 °
The number of mistakes provides a reality check on the representations made by
the producing party regarding the measures taken to avoid disclosure: if the number
of mistakes is small, testimony regarding the effort made to prevent disclosure
would seem to be corroborated. The usefulness of this factor is lessened, however,
because a simple arithmetic calculation regarding the percentage of documents
mistakenly produced says nothing about the cause of the mistake. A paralegal who
mistakenly releases a box of previously segregated, privileged documents commits
a single mistake but one that totals approximately 2,000 pages for counting
purposes.7 The cases do not show any consistent consideration of the cause of the
mistake and instead focus on the number of documents mistakenly produced. This
does not provide any insight into the equities of the situation or whether the
producing party should or should not be relieved from its mistake.
3. Extent of Disclosure
The courts also consider the extent of disclosure (the extent to which the other
parties have reviewed and analyzed the privileged document),72 which involves a
subjective determination regarding whether confidentiality can be restored in any
meaningful sense.73 As one court explained:
A limited disclosure resulting from glancing at an open file drawer or
designating documents for copying may notjustify a finding of waiver when the
party does not know the essence of the document's contents. However, when

documents were privileged); see also MG Capital L.L.C. v. Sullivan, No. 01 C 5815,2002 WL 1424560 (N.D. Ill.
July 1, 2002) (privilege waived due to production of two-page document in production totaling seventy pages);
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., No. 1P9601718-C, 2001 WL 699850 (S.D. Ind. May 29. 2001)
(in absence of stipulated protective order, court would have found waiver of privilege following production of 3,500
pages of privileged documents in production totaling 25,000 pages).
70. The failure to conduct an adequate pre-production review will occasionally trump modest disclosures
of privileged documents. See F.C. Cycles Int'l, Inc. v. Fila Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64 (D. Md. 1998) (privilege
was waived due to inadvertent production of three-page privileged document in production totaling 64,000 pages
because attorneys did not conduct second review after adverse party's inspection but before formal production);
Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz, Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404 (D.N.J. 1995) (privilege was waived due to inadvertent
production of multiple copies of privileged document in production totaling 681 documents, and then again in later
production totaling 381 documents, because attorney did not conduct any review for privilege); Cunningham v.
Conn. Mut. Life Ins., 845 F. Supp. 1403 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (privilege was waived due to inadvertent production of
four-page privileged document in production totaling four boxes; plaintiff did not review documents prior to
production); Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46 (M.D.N.C. 1987)
(privilege was waived due to inadvertent production of twenty privileged documents in production totaling 12,000
pages; defendant did not conduct second review after adverse party's inspection but before formal production).
71. See Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., Civil No. 03-1485,2006 WL 1967364 (D.P.R. July 11,2006)
(Defendant mistakenly merged two electronic files of documents [one of which contained all of its documents, the
other of which contained its non-privileged documents] with a single mouse click on the computer-a mistake that
resulted in the production of approximately 1,500 privileged documents. The district court focused solely on the
number of privileged documents produced, even though a single mistake caused the production of these documents,
when determining that defendant had been so careless in handling its documents as to justify waiver.).
72. McGreevy v. CSS Indus., Inc., No. Civ. A 95-CV-8063, 1996 WL 412813, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 17,
1996).
73. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276, 281 (M.D.N.C. 1992).
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disclosure is complete, a court order cannot restore confidentiality and, at best,
can only attempt to restrain further erosion.7"

Because disclosure is frequently "complete" in this sense by the time the issue
reaches the court's attention, this factor can (and sometimes does) trump the other
factors.75 The district courts are seriously divided on this point, with some
explaining that this factor tips in favor of waiver only when the document has
"worked its way into the fabric of the case" 76 (such as by being used in support of
a motion or to elicit testimony at a deposition), with others concluding that it tips
in favor of waiver merely from review by an adversary.7 7
The difficulty in application of this factor should become less pronounced as
increasing numbers of state bar associations impose specific obligations on
attorneys who inadvertently receive privileged materials (whether inside or outside

74. Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 51-52 (M.D.N.C.
1987) (citations omitted).
75. See Herndon v. U.S. Bancorp Asset Mgmt. Inc., No. 4:05 CV 01446,2007 WL 781788, at *5 (E.D. Mo.
Mar. 13, 2007) (plaintiff quoted document in its complaint and amended complaint and used it during the
depositions of defendant's representatives); Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., Civil No. 03-1485, 2006 WL
1967364, at *4 (D.P.R. July 11, 2006) ("Plaintiffs had access to the information during a four month period" before
defendant determined that a mistake had been made.); Crossroads Sys. (Texas), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., No. A03-CA-754, 2006 WL 1544621, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 31, 2006) (plaintiff substantively questioned defendant's
witness about privileged document at deposition); Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 02 C 3283, 2003 WL
22839808, at *3 (N.D. Il.Nov. 26, 2003) (defendant did not assert privilege until plaintiff attempted to use
document to impeach witness at trial); MG Capital L.L.C. v. Sullivan, No. 01 C 5815, 2002 WL 1424560, at *4
(N.D. Ill.
July 1, 2002) (full content of document disclosed at deposition); United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW,
Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 173 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (recipient studied privileged document for two weeks before alerting
producing party of mistake); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 293 (D. Mass. 2000)
(number of people saw privileged document; "the scope of the disclosure in this case is dramatic"); F.C. Cycles
Int'l, Inc. v. Fila Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64, 78 (D. Md. 1998) (document "worked its way into the fabric of the
case" through use at two depositions; "[t]hus, this factor compels a finding of waiver"); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v.
Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404,414 (D.N.J. 1995) (disclosure was complete based on substantive arguments made
by recipient in support of its position on motion to dismiss); Central Die Casting & Mfg. Co. v. Tokheim Corp.,
No. 93 C 7692, 1994 WL 444796, at *5 (N.D. 1Il. Aug. 15, 1994) (document incorporated in motion for summary
judgment); In re Recombinant DNA Tech. Patent & Contract Litig., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1881, 1908 (S.D. Ind. 1993)
(waiver was appropriate because several privileged documents were marked as deposition exhibits and used
extensively during the testimony of at least one witness); F.D.I.C. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138
F.R.D. 479, 483 (E.D. Va. 1991) (recipient was given three opportunities to learn contents of letter; "any order
issued by the Court would have only limited effect; it could not force NBNE to forget what has already been
learned"); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Grow-Tech Inc., 131 F.R.D. 179, 183 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (document was fully disclosed
both during and after document inspection; during inspection, attorney made notes regarding content of document
and then incorporated them into letter to client describing content and legal implications of it); Baxter Travenol
Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 117 F.R.D. 119, 120 (N.D. I11.
1987) (defendant quoted and attached copies of disputed
document to court files on three occasions over three-month period without objection); see also Kansas City Power
& Light Co. v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171, 172-73 (D. Kan. 1989) (despite
defendant's contention that it relied extensively on privileged document in preparing amended complaint and at
depositions, the record did not reflect that the document was crucial to either of these activities).
76. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276,281 (M.D.N.C. 1992) (documents had not been shown
to witnesses, experts, or the grand jury itself); see also Monarch Cement Co. v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 132 F.R.D.
558, 560 (D. Kan. 1990) (disclosure limited to defendant's attorneys).
77. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276, 281 (M.D.N.C. 1992) (disclosure deemed
"complete" solely because privileged document was produced to government investigator); Parkway Gallery
Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 51-52 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (disclosure deemed
"complete" solely by virtue of document's production and without any showing that document had been used or
relied upon by producing party); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323,330 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (disclosure
deemed "complete" because receiving party "must have" learned of the content of privileged documents after they
were produced).
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the discovery context) to alert their opponent of the mistake and then refrain from
reviewing the document until the waiver issue is resolved. The ABA's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct currently require attorneys who receive privileged
documents in circumstances in which they "know or reasonably should know" of

a mistake to notify the sender.78 By requiring prompt notice of a perceived mistake,
the model rule permits the producing party to seek relief before the recipient can
justifiably rely upon the document's availability in any meaningful sense (and
certainly before it becomes woven into the fabric of the case). Several state bar
associations, through rules and formal ethics opinions, impose additional
obligations in these circumstances such as requiring the recipient to refrain from
reviewing the document and to return it upon request.79 These additional

78. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 4.4(b) (2002). The comment notes that the recipient may return
the document unread, but that this is a matter of personal choice in the absence of applicable law requiring her to
do so. Id. cmt.3. This rule has been adopted by Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Montana,
Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming (Links to the various states' rules of professional conduct are available on the
American Bar Association's website at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/links.html.).
79. New Jersey's rules of professional conduct provide that a "lawyer who receives a document and has
reasonable cause to believe that the document was inadvertently sent shall not read the document or, if he or she
has begun to do so, shall stop reading the document, promptly notify the sender, and return the document to the
sender." N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 4.4(b) (2004). The same or similar outcomes are reached in other
states through ethics opinions. See Ethics Comm. of the Colo. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 108 (2000), available at
http://www.cobar.org/group/display.cfm?genid= 1830 (attorney who receives documents that are facially privileged
must notify sender upon discovering the error unless she knows the sender has intentionally waived privilege;
attorney who knows of inadvertence before reviewing the documents must, in addition to giving notice, refrain from
examining it and "abide by the sending lawyer's instructions as to their disposition"); Ky. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op.
KBA E-374 (1995), available at http://www.kybar.org/Default.aspx?tabid=30 (attorney who receives materials
under circumstances in which it is clear that they were not intended for her should "refrain from examining the
materials, notify the sender, and abide by the instructions of the sender regarding the disposition of the materials");
Ethics Comm. of the N.H. Bar Ass'n, Practical Ethics Articles (June 23, 1994), available at http://www.nhbar.org/
pdfs/PEA6-94.pdf (attorney who receives materials that are facially privileged should not examine them, should
notify the sender, and should abide by her instructions as to disposition; attorney who reads materials before
discovering mistake may use the information contained therein in most circumstances but should notify the sender
under most circumstances that the information has been received and read); Ethics Comm. of the N.C. Bar Ass'n,
Op. RPC 252 (1997), available at http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/ethics.asp?id=252 (attorney in receipt of materials
that appear on their face to be the subject of the attorney-client privilege that were inadvertently sent to her should
refrain from examining them and return them to the sender); Or. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 2005-150 (2005),
available at http://www.osbar.orgl docs/ethics/2005-150.pdf (attorney who receives document that she should
know from the context is privileged and inadvertently produced should notify producing party and follow any
instructions regarding disposition); Ethics Advisory Comm. of the Utah State Bar Ass'n, Op. 99-01 (1999),
available at http://www.utahbar.orglrules-ops-pols/ethics-opinions/op-99-Ol.html (attorney who receives
privileged communication should refrain from reading the document beyond that which is necessary to determine
privileged status, notify sender, and then follow instructions regarding disposition or refrain from using them until
a ruling can be obtained regarding the consequence of disclosure); see also Legal Ethics Comm. of the D.C. Bar,
Formal Op. 256 (1995), available at http://www.dcbar.orglfor-lawyers/ethicsllegalethics/opinions/opinion
256.cfm (An attorney who receives documents with no indication that disclosure was inadvertent may retain and
use the disclosed information; attorney who receives documents and who has not reviewed them before learning
of inadvertence should "seek guidance from the sending lawyer and, if [she] confirms.. .inadvertence ... and requests
return of the material, unread, the receiving lawyer should do so."); l. State Bar Ass'n Advisory Op. No. 98-04
(1999), available at http://www.isba.org/ethicsopinions/98-04.asp (attorney may use information contained in
inadvertently disclosed document so long as she does not have notice of mistake before doing so; attorney who
knows of an inadvertent transmission before reviewing any such document should return it to the sender without
any examination); Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. No. 93-11 (1993),
available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/BOC/Advisory-Opinions/display.asp (attorney who conducts public
records search and discovers privileged memorandum may read but has an ethical duty to notify opposing counsel).
Notably, the Maine Bar Association withdrew an earlier formal opinion finding that an attorney could use
inadvertently disclosed documents to the extent permitted by substantive law but that she must notify the producing
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obligations, although of relatively recent origin, reflect increased interest within
state and local bar associations to promote professionalism and trust among
attorneys. The one-two punch of these ethical obligations should lead to fewer
instances in which the receiving party will be able to review an inadvertently
produced document in any meaningful sense before alerting the producing party of
the mistake-thus reducing the number of situations in which waiver is found
because the disclosure is "complete."
4. Time to Correct Mistake
The courts also consider the time taken by the producing party to seek corrective
measures once it learns of a mistake. For purposes of determining whether the
producing party unnecessarily delayed efforts to correct the mistake, the critical
point in time is the date on which it learns of the mistake rather than the date on
which it produced the document (although some courts incorrectly use this latter
point in time for purposes of performing the waiver analysis). 8° This factor tips in
favor of preserving the privilege so long as the producing party acts within one
month of learning of its mistake-usually by demanding return of the document or
filing a motion for a protective order (although most cases involve efforts to correct
the problem almost immediately).81 This factor tips in favor of waiver, however,

party of its error. See Prof'I Ethics Comm'n of the Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 172 (2000), available at
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/Ethics%200pinions/Opinion%2017.htm. The Maine Bar Association took this
action because of the emergence of substantive law imposing an obligation to return inadvertently disclosed
materials to the sender. Id. Ethics opinions on this subject typically disclaim any attempt to resolve the question
of whether there has been a waiver of the privilege. Id.
80. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 233 F.R.D. 483,490 (N.D. Miss. 2006)
(time to correct mistake is "measured from the time when counsel realizes that there has been inadvertent
production" (emphasis omitted)); United States v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 295,298 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (period
for determining diligence runs from when producing party knew or with reasonable diligence should have known
of the inadvertent disclosure); Prescient Partners, L.P. v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 7590, 1997 WL
736726, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1997); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining
Co., 133 F.R.D. 171, 172 (D. Kan. 1989); see also United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, No. 05 C 5140, 2007
WL 1518914, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2007) ("While several years passed between the production...and NAR's
assertion of privilege, NAR took virtually no time to rectify the error once DOJ notified it of the production."). But
see Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., Civil No. 03-1485, 2006 WL 1967364, at *4 (D.P.R. July 11, 2006)
(evaluating delay from date of production rather than date of discovery); Tokar v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 5311,
1999 WL 138814, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Central Die Casting & Mfg. Co. v. Tokheim Corp., No. 93 C 7692, 1994
WL 444796, at *5 (N.D. 111.Aug. 15, 1994); In re Sause Bros. Ocean Towing, 144 F.R.D. 111, 115 (D. Or. 1991).
81. See Expert Choice, Inc. v. Gartner, Inc., No. 3:03 CV 02234, 2007 WL 951662, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar.
27, 2007) (request for return of privileged documents within two days of learning of mistake); Herndon v. U.S.
Bancorp Asset Mgmt. Inc., No. 4:05 CV 01446,2007 WL 781788, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 13,2007) (written request
for return of document within one week of learning of mistake); Pucket v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No. 23-2, 239
F.R.D. 572,587 (D.S.D. 2006) (oral request for return of document upon seeing it at deposition); United Investors
Life Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 233 F.R.D. 483, 490 (N.D. Miss. 2006) (oral request for return of
document upon seeing it at deposition and request for return of other documents within four days of discovery of
mistake); United States v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 295, 298-99 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (alerting adversaries of
mistake and seeking destruction of document within a matter of weeks); Myers v. City of Highland Village, 212
F.R.D. 324, 327 (E.D. Tex. 2003) (oral request to return document upon seeing it at deposition and motion for
protective order within three weeks thereafter); Lifewise Master Funding v. Telebank, 206 F.R.D. 298, 300 (D.
Utah 2002) (motion for protective order seeking return of documents within thirty-three days of notifying defendant
of the error); United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 173 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (oral and written
request for return within one day of learning of mistake but criticizing producing party's attorneys for failing
promptly to review its entire production to determine whether there were other mistakes); Starway v. Ind. Sch. Dist.
No. 625, 187 F.R.D. 595, 598 (D. Minn. 1999) (oral assertion of privilege when receiving party sought to use
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when the producing party delays beyond this period or otherwise equivocates
regarding the privilege.82 These outcomes are not surprising: prompt action
demonstrates an interest in preserving the privilege and also reinforces the argument
that a simple mistake has been made; delay in seeking a remedy, on the other hand,
implies indifference to confidentiality.
5. Fairness
The courts also consider an overarching principle of fairness in determining
whether there has been a waiver, taking into consideration the importance of the
privilege (both to the producing party and to society in general) and the impact on
the receiving party from loss of evidence if the privilege is upheld.83 This factor tips

document at deposition followed by motion ten days later for return of document); Wallace v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
179 F.R.D. 313, 314 (D. Kan. 1998) (six days after inspection by plaintiff's counsel and before any documents
were copied and produced to plaintiff); Prescient Partners, L.P. v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 7590, 1997
WL 736726, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1997) (letter seeking return of documents on the day after learning of
mistake); Aramony v. United Way of Am., 969 F. Supp. 226, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (letter demanding return of
documents sent on the day after learning of mistake); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160
F.R.D. 437, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (plaintiffs immediately sought return of documents after being alerted of the
production); Cunningham v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins., 845 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (objection at
deposition to use of document followed by letter explaining position on privilege twenty-one days later followed
by motion for protective order); F.D.I.C. v. Ernst & Whinney, 137 F.R.D. 14, 17-18 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) (plaintiff
acted promptly to seek return of documents upon learning of mistake); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v.
Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171, 172 (D. Kan. 1989) (motion for protective order within
two weeks of learning of mistake); Baker's Aid, a Div. ofM. Raubvogel Co. v. Hussman Foodservice Co., No. CV
87-0937, 1988 WL 138254, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1988) (statement that document was privileged was made
contemporaneously with document inspection). But see Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D.
287,292-93 (D. Mass. 2000) (criticizing attorneys for failing to discover problem during five-day period between
production and discovery of mistake by recipient).
82. See Crossroads Sys. (Texas), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., No. A-03-CA-754-SS, 2006 WL 1544621, at
*3 (W.D. Tex. May 31, 2006) (three-month delay in asserting privilege); Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., No.
M 18-302, 931745, 2003 WL 289640, at * 14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003) (seven-week delay in asserting privilege);
MG Capital L.L.C. v. Sullivan, No. 01 C 5815, 2002 WL 1424560, at *3-4 (N.D. I11.July 1, 2002) (three-yearsand-seven-month delay between notice of mistake and motion for protective order); Koch Materials Co. v. Shore
Slurry Seal, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 109, 119 (D.N.J. 2002) (attorney's equivocation regarding application of privilege
and assertion of privilege did not reflect prompt action necessary to avoid waiver); F.C. Cycles Int'l, Inc. v. Fila
Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64, 73-74 (D. Md. 1998) (although document was marked as exhibit at deposition,
producing party did not object or seek return; when document was shown to another witness at deposition eleven
months later, producing party again failed to object); In re Recombinant DNA Tech. Patent & Contract Litig., 30
U.S.P.Q.2d 1881, 1908 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (privilege was not asserted for two weeks beyond time privileged
documents were marked as exhibits at deposition and used extensively with at least one witness; although not long,
this delay takes on greater significance given the potential for receiving party to read, analyze, and rely on
document); Allen-Bradley Co., Inc. v. Autotech Corp., No. 86 C 8514, 1989 WL 134500, at *2 (N.D. 111.Oct. 11,
1989) (plaintiff raised objections concerning production of documents in open court but failed to say anything
regarding privilege); Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 117 F.R.D. 119, 121 (N.D. II1. 1987) (failure to
assert privilege and seek return of document for at least three months after becoming aware of mistake justified loss
of privilege).
83. See Myers v. City of Highland Village, 212 F.R.D. 324,328 (E.D. Tex. 2003) ("In determining whether
an inadvertent production of a privileged document amounts to a waiver, the importance of the attorney-client
privilege must not be ignored."); United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 181-82 (C.D. Cal.
2001) ("[Tlhe importance of the attorney-client privilege cannot be ignored" in evaluating fairness factors;
"society-not just theproducing party-has an interest in avoiding a waiver."); F.C. Cycles Int'l, Inc. v. Fila Sport,
S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64, 78 (D. Md. 1998) ("Whether fundamental fairness weighs for or against waiver largely
depends on the extent of reliance the party has made on the document, in its case."); Prescient Partners, L.P. v.
Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 7590, 1997 WL 736726, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1997) ("Absent any
prejudice.. .caused by restoring immunity to the documents, '[i]t would be inappropriate for the client of producing
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in relation to the court's evaluation of the other factors (with the court frequently
using this factor to summarize its findings with respect to the other four). 8' This
factor does not tip the balance in favor of waiver simply because the pertinent
document can be characterized as a "hot" document,8 5 as "relevance" would nearly
always tip in favor of waiver.86 The absence of any real content to this factor (and
the absence of any meaningful impact on the waiver analysis) suggests that it is an
irrelevancy.
C. The Lenient Approach

Under the lenient approach, the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document
does not result in waiver so long as the client did not intend this result.87 The

counsel to suffer the waiver of privilege."' (quoting Aramony v. United Way of Am., 969 F. Supp. 226, 237
(S.D.N.Y. 1997))).
84. See United States v. Mallinckrodt, 227 F.R.D. 295, 299 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (fairness factor analyzed in
relation to court's earlier findings regarding the other four factors); Laquila Const., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co.
of Ill., No. 98-CIV-5920, 1999 WL 232901, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1999) (fairness evaluated in relation to
inadvertent production at early stage of litigation and absence of meaningful reliance by receiving party); Baker's
Aid, A Div. of M. Raubvogel Co. v. Hussman Foodservice Co., No. CV 87-0937, 1988 WL 138254, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1988) (fairness evaluated in relation to inadvertent production).
85. United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, No. 05 C 5140, 2007 WL 1518914, at *3 (N.D. III. May 22,
2007) ("[R]elevancy alone does not support disruption of the privilege."); United States v. Mallinckrodt, 227
F.R.D. 295, 299 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (privileged document contains admissions that would be helpful to defendant
but that does not outweigh injustice that would occur if plaintiff were stripped of privilege); United States ex rel.
Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 183-84 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("The potential value of the inadvertently-produced
privileged documents to the receiving party is beside the point....
'The prejudice factor focuses only on whether
the act of restoring immunity to an inadvertently disclosed document would be unfair, not whether the privilege
itself deprives parties ofpertinent information."' (quoting Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A.,
160 F.R.D. 437, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1995))); Starway v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 187 F.R.D. 595, 598 (D. Minn.
1999) (while document may be helpful to plaintiff, that does not justify finding of waiver).
86. See Myers v. City of Highland Village, 212 F.R.D. 324, 328 (E.D. Tex. 2003) ("A party to whom
privileged documents are produced inadvertently has no inherent 'fairness' interest in keeping them."); United
States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 182 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (receiving party could not justifiably rely
upon continued availability of documents that were stamped "attorney-client privileged"); F.C. Cycles Int'l, Inc.
v. Fila Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64,78 (D. Md. 1998) ("Whether fundamental fairness weighs for or against waiver
largely depends on the extent of reliance the party has made on the document, in its case."); Prescient Partners, L.P.
v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 7590, 1997 WL 736726, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1997) ("Absent any
prejudice.. .caused by restoring immunity to the documents, '[it would be inappropriate for the client of producing
counsel to suffer waiver of privilege."' (quoting Aramony v. United Way of Am., 969 F. Supp. 226,237 (S.D.N.Y.
1997))); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (no
prejudice to recipient who had not relied on document); Cunningham v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins., 845 F. Supp. 1403,
1409 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (fairness factor tips in favor of waiver because privilege was not asserted until after
discovery cutoff and defendant had reviewed contents of document); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Pittsburgh
& Midway Coal Mining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171, 174 (D. Kan. 1989) (although privileged documents were probative
of certain claims, fairness did not require waiver; same information was discoverable from other sources and
defendant could not justifiably rely upon the documents given that they were identified on privilege log). But see
Atronic Int'l, GMBH v. SAI Semispecialists of Am., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 160, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (The fairness
factor tipped in favor of waiver because privileged documents flatly contradicted factual assertions made by
plaintiff in litigation and thus "defendant may be prejudiced by restoring immunity to the inadvertently disclosed
e-mails.").
87. See lazar v. Mauney, 192 F.R.D. 324, 330 (N.D. Ga. 2000) ("The inadvertent disclosure of plaintiff's
counsel does not waive the plaintiff's attorney-client privilege because the privilege can be waived only by the
intentional relinquishment of the privilege by the client."); Van Hull v. Marriott Courtyard, 63 F. Supp. 2d 840,
840 (N.D. Ohio 1999) ("[llnadvertent disclosure of otherwise privilege[d] materials [does] not result in a loss of
the attorney-client privilege.... [R]eceiving counsel was required, as a matter of professional responsibility, to
inform sending counsel of his receipt of the document and return it without using or disseminating it."); In re Se.
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client's subjective intention to preserve confidentiality trumps the objective fact of
disclosure. As one court explained:
We are taught from the first year in law school that waiver imports the
"intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." Inadvertent
production is the antithesis of that concept .... [The producing party's]
lawyer...might well have been negligent in failing to cull the files of the letters
before turning over the files. But if we are serious about the attorney-client
privilege and its relation to the client's welfare, we should require more than
such negligence by counsel before the client can be deemed to have given up the
privilege. 8

The lenient approach is justified on the ground that only the client can waive the
privilege and that a mistake by her attorney is insufficient in this regard;89 that client
apprehension about disclosure to an attorney will be lessened because of the
Banking Corp. Secs. & Loan Loss Reserves Litig., 212 B.R. 386, 393 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (privilege was not waived
because there was "no evidence that reflects an intention by the FDIC to voluntarily give these documents to the
Trustee"); Transp. Equip. Sales Corp. v. BMY Wheeled Vehicles, 930 F. Supp. 1187, 1187 (N.D. Ohio 1996)
("This [strict] waiver approach has the virtues of simplicity and ease of application. Weighing against those
virtues-and they are the only virtues that I can perceive-is the likelihood that this approach will foster and
condone sharp practice, distrust, and animosity among lawyers-none of which does anything to accomplish justice
fairly and expeditiously."); Berg Elecs., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261,263 (D. Del. 1995) (lenient approach
"best serves the interests of the attorney-client privilege"); Smith v. Armour Pharm. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1573, 1576
(S.D. Fla. 1993) ("[lIn order for a waiver of the privilege to be found, the disclosure must have been intended by
the client."); Shriver v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., Inc., 145 F.R.D. 112, 115 (D. Colo. 1992) ("Although the
Colorado Supreme Court has not expressly spoken on the issue, the Colorado case law is most consistent with the
view that inadvertent disclosure by counsel does not produce a waiver."); Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen,
Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991) ("[W]e believe the better reasoned rule is.. that mere inadvertent
production by the attorney does not waive the client's privilege."); Helman v. Murry's Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp.
1099, 1104 (D. Del. 1990) ("The better reasoned rule, however, provides that inadvertent disclosure does not waive
the privilege."); Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Bass, Civ. A No. 88-5257, 1989 WL 9354, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 1989)
('The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, not to the attorney, and the mere inadvertent production of
documents by counsel does not waive an assertion of the privilege."); In re Sealed Case, 120 F.R.D. 66, 72 (N.D.
111.1988) ("Inadvertent production does not waive the privilege."); Dentsply Int'l, Inc. v. Sybron Corp., No. 84 C
3822, 1987 WL 5430, at *1 (N.D. 111.Jan. 14, 1987) (adopting subjective approach to waiver analysis); KansasNebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12,21 (D. Neb. 1985) (applying lenient approach but
emphasizing facts that would also support finding of no waiver under middle approach); Mendenhall v. BarberGreene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951,955 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (the lenient approach is preferable because it is most consistent
with notions of client welfare); Dunn Chem. Co. v. Sybron Corp., Misc. No. 8-85, 1975 WL 970, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 9, 1975) ("A waiver must be intentional to be effective."); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448,
451 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ("Only the client can waive this privilege and, to support a finding of waiver, there must be
evidence that he intended to waive it.").
88. Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951,955 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (quoting United States ex rel.
Ross v. Franzen, 668 F.2d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 1982)). Although this passage is frequently quoted by courts
embracing the lenient approach, it is frequently criticized because it equates the loss of an evidentiary privilege
(which can occur without knowledge of the privilege or any intent to relinquish it) with waiver of a constitutional
right (which requires a knowing and intentional relinquishment). See supra notes 13, 25. This criticism misses the
mark, however, because most implied waiver is preceded by sufficient consideration by the client and her attorney
to satisfy the requirements for knowing and intentional waiver. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
89. Lazar v. Mauney, 192 F.R.D. 324, 330 (N.D. Ga. 2000); Berg Elecs., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp.
261, 263 (D. Del. 1995); Smith v. Armour Pharm. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1573, 1576-77 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Shriver v.
Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 145 F.R.D. 112, 115 (D. Colo. 1992); Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen,
Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Helman v. Murry's Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del.
1990); Fid. Bank, N.A. v. Bass, C1V. A. No. 88-5257, 1989 WL 9354, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 1989); Mendenhall
v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951,955 (N.D. IM.1982); Dunn Chem. Co. v. Sybron Corp., Misc. No. 8-85,
1975 WL 970, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1975); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
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reduced risk that her statements could come back to haunt her;90 and that it is
predictable and leads to certain results. 9' The courts adopting this approach
acknowledge that confidentiality cannot be restored following disclosure, but
nevertheless reason that the damage can be minimized by prohibiting future use of
the document.9 2 These courts also appear concerned about the ethical ramifications
of exploiting this type of mistake by an adversary. 93
The lenient approach is criticized because of the perceived concern that it will
promote laxity (if not outright sloppiness) among attorneys in handling documents
and protecting the privilege during discovery.94 This concern is overstated, however,
because an attorney is motivated to protect the privilege for reasons unrelated to
evidentiary principles. First, an attorney is ethically obligated to preserve
confidentiality even when she knows that a mistakenly produced document will be
returned (an ethical obligation, the violation of which can result in discipline in the
absence of harm to the client, that attaches without regard to any evidentiary rule).95
Second, an attorney is motivated by the specter of malpractice claims to avoid any
mistake that might cause the client to question her competence, particularly
when-notwithstanding the return of a document-her adversary gains some insight
into the case that may not have otherwise occurred to her in the absence of mistaken
production. Although these two problems are contingent on the case going badly,
the potential that they could mature into actual problems is always present in the
attorney's mind. Third, apart from these less immediate concerns, an attorney is
motivated by sheer competitiveness to review her client's documents in some

90. Berg Elecs., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261, 263 (D. Del. 1995); Shriver v. Baskin-Robbins Ice
Cream Co., 145 F.R.D. 112, 115 n.3 (D. Colo. 1992).
91. Berg Elecs., 875 F. Supp. at 263.
92. Smith v. Armour Pharm. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1573, 1576-78 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (plaintiff prohibited from
citing privileged document in further proceedings); Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936,
938 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (plaintiff ordered to return an inadvertently produced transcript and prohibited from further
disclosure of any confidential communication); Bass, CIV. A. No. 88-5257, 1989 WL 9354, at *1 (defendant
ordered to return documents).
93. See Lazar v. Mauney, 192 F.R.D. 324, 330 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (characterizing attorneys as unprofessional
and dishonest for secretly retaining copy of privileged document inadvertently produced during discovery); Transp.
Equip. Sales Corp. v. BMY Wheeled Vehicles, 930 F. Supp. 1187, 1187-88 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (noting that strict
approach can lead to sharp practices; attorneys failed to take the "better, and more ethical approach" when they
did not contact producing party and inform it of the mistake and then follow the producing party's instructions
regarding the document, citing ABA Formal Opinion regarding handling of inadvertently disclosed documents);
cf. Resolution Trust Corp. v. First Am. Bank, 868 F. Supp. 217,220 (W.D. Mich. 1994) ("In this Court's judgment,
common sense and a high sensitivity toward ethics and the importance of attorney-client confidentiality and
privilege should have immediately caused the plaintiffs attorneys to notify defendant's counsel of his office's
mistake... While lawyers have an obligation to vigorously advocate the positions of their clients, this does not
include the obligation to take advantage of a clerical mistake in opposing counsel's office where something so
important as the attorney-client privilege is involved.").
94. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 292 (D. Mass. 2000).
95. Attorneys in every state are obligated to preserve client confidences irrespective of whether a particular
confidence is relevant to the resolution of a dispute. Rule 1.6(a) of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
broadly prohibits attorneys from revealing "information relating to the representation of a client unless the client
gives informed consent." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007), available at http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mrpclrule_1 _6.html. The Comment reiterates that a "fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship
is that, in the absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the

representation." Id. cmt. 2, availableat http://www.abanet.orglcpr/mrpc/rule 1_6_comm.html. Internet links to
the various state rules of professional conduct are available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/links.html.
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fashion prior to production to preserve the information edge that every attorney
seeks with respect to the facts and underlying evidence.
But, even if a lesser standard would cause some attorneys to be less vigilant then
they otherwise might (perhaps because the client cannot afford, or more likely does
not want to pay, the high price of pre-production review) the question arises-"so
what?" If the admonition contained in Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is to be taken seriously, and the courts are truly interested in promoting
the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action," they must be
willing to consider the cost-impact to clients from litigation activities that require
significantly more effort than perhaps is justified given the relation of the activity
to the resolution of the case. While document discovery may occasionally unearth
a "smoking gun" that tips the balance at trial, more typically the parties will slog
through thousands of documents at great expense when perhaps only a few hundred
will see the light of day during any stage of the litigation and only a handful will
make a difference at trial.
The real defect in the lenient approach is that it is entirely open-ended and
permits the producing party to raise the privilege long after production and
incorporation into the fabric of the case.96 The rule does not provide any safety
valve for situations in which the producing party failed to interpose the privilege
within a reasonable time after learning of its mistake. Indeed, the lenient approach
would permit the producing party to raise the privilege at trial as the pertinent
document is being handed to a witness-leading to concerns of tactical "disclosure"
with the full expectation of reclaiming the document after an adversary has digested
its contents.
III. LATCHING ONTO LACHES-A SIMPLE TEST FOR WAIVER
The harshness of the strict approach, the vagaries of the middle approach, and the
open-endedness of the lenient approach suggest that alternative solutions should be
considered. One that eliminates several of these problems is a rules-based standard
that focuses on the time taken by the producing party to assert the privilege upon
learning of a mistake. Such a rule would be consistent with the maxim that one who
is slow to assert her rights should be precluded from doing so when it would
prejudice another97 and the common sense notion that, until a document has been

96. The extent to which the lenient approach mightjustify assertions of privilege long after production (such
as at trial) is difficult to know because there are not any cases involving this precise procedural posture. On its face,
the approach would apply and would allow the producing party to reclaim the document when it is literally being
handed to a witness during cross examination. The outcome in such a scenario is difficult to predict because,
ironically, the lenient approach cases typically involve parties that attempted to avoid production and that would
likely have satisfied the requirements of the middle approach if the pertinent court applied that standard. See Lazar
v. Mauney, 192 F.R.D. 324 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (attorney reviewed documents prior to production but missed a threepage privileged document in production totaling 996 pages; attorney sought return of the document on same day
she discovered the mistake); Berg Elecs., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del. 1995) (attorney reviewed
documents prior to production and demanded their return when recipient sought to use a document at deposition).
97. Laches is an affirmative defense that may be interposed to preclude the assertion of a claim. It is
"generally defined as slackness or carelessness toward duty or opportunity. It is defined as the neglect or delay in
bringing suit to remedy an alleged wrong that, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances, causes
prejudice to an adverse party and operates as an equitable bar." 27A AM. JUR. 2d Equity § 140, at 618 (1996).
Laches ordinarily requires "'an unreasonable lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted'
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worked into the fabric of a case, there is not any principled reason to prohibit the
producing party from reclaiming it. Moreover, such a rule would promote
uniformity and predictability and would also lead to the same outcome in nearly all
the cases in which the fact-intensive middle approach is currently used-thus
implying that the same outcome can be reached through a far simpler method.
A. The Text for a Suggested Rule
The text for a rule along these lines, which would logically follow the general
rule regarding claims of privilege or immunity in Rule 26(b)(5), would provide:
A party or nonparty does not lose a privilege or protection for trial-preparation
material with respect to documents disclosed or produced pursuant to Rules 26,
33, 34 or 45 so long as the party or nonparty asserts the privilege or protection
within ten days of actual notice of such disclosure or production, except that:
(i) A party or nonparty that receives actual notice in connection with a motion
must assert the privilege or protection not later than two days after the last brief
directed to the motion is filed with the court; or
(ii) A party or nonparty that receives actual notice in connection with a proceeding (including depositions, hearings or trial) must assert the privilege or
protection before the document is used in any material way.
If a party or nonparty asserts a privilege or protection within the time
prescribed in this rule, the document and all copies shall be returned to the party
or nonparty asserting such privilege or protection. This rule does not prohibit a
party from objecting to a claim of privilege or protection on the ground that it
is untimely under this rule.
The suggested rule would permit parties and nonparties to reclaim inadvertently
produced documents in most circumstances so long as the pertinent privilege or
immunity is raised within ten days of actual notice of the mistake. For example, a
producing party that learns of a mistake while reviewing its own documents in
preparation for a deposition would have ten days to inform the other parties of the
mistake and formally assert the privilege or immunity. The other parties would then
be required to return the document.9" Likewise, a producing party that is notified by
another party regarding a potential mistake would have ten days from receipt of
such notice to assert the privilege. If another party believes the producing party
failed to assert the privilege or immunity in a timely fashion, the suggested rule
preserves the ability to challenge the continued application of the privilege.
A ten-day window for asserting a privilege or immunity is consistent with the
time allowed for asserting such claims in an analogous state rule 99 and should be
sufficient to accommodate the producing party's interest in having enough time to
investigate the situation after receiving notice of a potential problem. Indeed, ten

and 'prejudice arising therefrom."' Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 400 F.3d
992, 997 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hot Wax,Inc. v. Turtle Wax,Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 1999)).
98. The producing party would not have any incentive to delay notification because such delay would
increase the potential that the pertinent document had been read, analyzed, and distributed to others.
99. Texas adopted a similar rule for asserting after-the-fact claims of privilege and immunity with respect
to inadvertently produced documents. See TEx. R. CIv. P. 193.3(d) (party may assert claim of privilege within ten
days of discovery of mistaken production).
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days appears to be more than adequate given the speed with which the producing
party typically raises the privilege upon learning of a mistake, as reflected in the
cases reviewing this factor under the middle approach. 1° Moreover, the ten-day
period should accommodate the receiving party's interest in obtaining a prompt
decision so that it can continue preparing its case for trial knowing-one way or the
other-whether the pertinent document will be available for future use. A receiving
party that notifies a producing party of a mistake should be able to assume, after two
weeks pass without any response,'' that the document was either intentionally
produced or that the producing party is indifferent to confidentiality. The suggested
rule thus presumes prejudice to other parties when the producing party fails to assert
the privilege within ten days.' °2
The time in which the producing party must assert the privilege is different,
however, when failure to act promptly could make corrective action difficult if not
impossible. For example, a prompt assertion of the privilege is appropriate when the
producing party receives a motion or responsive brief that relies in some way upon
the content of a privileged document. The producing party should be expected to act
quickly because, at a minimum, the document is contained in the clerk's file and
thus available to the public. Delay in this circumstance increases the likelihood that
the document will be reviewed by a member of the public before an order sealing
the document can be entered, thus undermining the effectiveness of relief. Perhaps
more importantly, the suggested rule recognizes that increasing numbers of motions
are decided without oral argument and are therefore ready for consideration
immediately after the moving party files its reply brief. Although most courts cannot
(and plainly do not) decide motions instantaneously, a ten-day window may prove
too long in those situations in which the court can decide, and is prepared to decide,
quickly. In this circumstance, the court may rely, directly or indirectly, on an
otherwise privileged document in reaching a decision before the ten-day period
expires. To avoid the problems that would arise if the privilege were thereafter
asserted, the suggested rule requires the producing party to act within two days of
the filing of the last brief. Given the intense focus litigants place on motions and
responsive filings, the two-day period should be entirely workable.
A more immediate claim of privilege is also appropriate when the producing
party learns of its mistake in "real time," such as at a deposition or hearing or at
trial. The producing party should be expected to act immediately because, in the
absence of action, the document will be used as evidence or as a springboard for
other evidence. If the producing party fails to act, and thus allows a document to be
used in either of these fashions, it would be extremely difficult (if not impossible)
to undo the effects on the evidentiary record. The situations in which this would
apply are modest, however. A witness who is permitted to testify at a deposition
100. See supra notes 81-82.
101. Because the time for asserting the privilege is ten days, any intervening Saturday, Sunday or national
holiday would be excluded for counting purposes and a ten-day period for taking action becomes, in effect, a twoweek period. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(a).
102. Although an actual prejudice standard could be used, such a standard is inherently fact-intensive and
would unnecessarily increase the time and effort necessary to resolve the waiver issue. Moreover, the receiving
party would frequently have difficulty demonstrating prejudice except when a document has been used in some
material way at a deposition or hearing or at trial.
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regarding the content of a privileged document would cause waiver under existing
principles and so the requirement that the producing party assert the privilege
immediately does not impose any greater obligation than that which already exists.
Nor is there any likelihood that this rule would have a significant impact on trial
proceedings. The requirement in most judicial districts that the parties prepare
pretrial statements identifying the documents they may use during their respective
cases-in-chief means that most privileged documents will be identified before trial
and reclaimed consistently with the time requirements of the suggested rule. Thus,
the ten-day period should be adequate in all but the unusual situation in which (a)
a privileged document is used for impeachment purposes, (b) the document was
never used for any purpose at any earlier stage of the case, and (c) the document
was not identified on the party's exhibit list because it did not anticipate using it
during its case-in-chief. The number of cases in which these three circumstances
coalesce should be few.
The phrase "used in a material way" is intended to distinguish the situation in
which a witness is asked substantive questions regarding the content of a document
(why did you say this, what were you trying to accomplish in saying that) as
opposed to predicate questions regarding the applicability of the privilege (who
wrote the document, to whom was it sent). Any rule or standard necessarily requires
some sort of materiality threshold to ensure that the mere marking of a document
as an exhibit, without more, does not result in a loss of the privilege.
An "actual notice" requirement is used to avoid potential arguments that the
producing party possessed constructive notice of its mistake by virtue of the
continuing opportunity to review its documents during the litigation process. Such
a requirement would also motivate the other parties to inform the producing party
of a mistake because, in the absence of such notice, the receiving party will be
unable to use the document without concern that the producing party will assert the
privilege once its availability comes to light. And, perhaps most importantly, an
actual notice requirement eliminates the potential for arguments that notice as to
one mistake constitutes constructive notice as to all others. As such, a producing
party would not be required, upon learning of one mistake, to review the remainder
of its production to determine whether there are other, similar mistakes.
The rule provides expressly that the receiving parties can challenge the timeliness
of the claim (although this would be implicit in the absence of such language). The
actual notice requirement should limit the number of situations in which there is a
credible claim that the producing party failed to act within the required period. An
actual notice requirement should result in the creation of a clean paper record
regarding (a) the unprompted assertion of the privilege by the producing party or (b)
notice of a mistake from a receiving party followed by assertion of the privilege by
the producing party, such that any factual disputes regarding these matters will be
few and easily resolved.'1 3

103. The suggested rule does not address whether a producing party that reclaims a privileged document can
preclude a receiving party from pursuing evidence or making arguments on the ground that the receiving party is
exploiting the content of the reclaimed document-in effect, a civil analogue to the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine.
On the one hand, reclaiming a document is hollow relief if the receiving party can subsequently use the
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B. The Advantages of a Rules-Based Standardfor Waiver
A rules-based standard is preferable to a common law standard for two reasons:
it provides a uniform standard for use by the various district courts (thus eliminating
the three competing approaches currently used in federal question cases) and it
permits a common standard for use by the district courts in federal question and
diversity cases (thus eliminating the potential for confusion regarding the applicable
law when evaluating waiver claims). These alone justify a single standard.
First, a rules-based standard may be the only means to a unified standard. The
common law experience demonstrates that there is not an obvious solution for
questions of waiver arising out of document discovery, as evidenced by the three
approaches embraced by the federal courts."° The three approaches implicitly
acknowledge that a choice must be made regarding competing alternatives that
promote different interests and values. Indeed, the common law experience
demonstrates that the selection of a standard frequently varies among judges within
the same locality. Three district courts have applied all three approaches at one time
or another; 0 5 two other district courts have applied two of the approaches at one
time or another;'°6 and district courts within nine circuits have applied different
approaches at one time or another.0 7

content to advance a claim or defense. On the other hand, having reclaimed the document (rather than losing the
privilege) the producing party should not be allowed to leverage its mistake and argue that an adversary should be
prevented from seeking evidence or making arguments in the absence of truly compelling evidence of a causal
connection between the mistaken disclosure and the receiving party's subsequent conduct. Put another way, the
receiving party should not be placed in a worse position because of a mistake made by her adversary than she would
have been absent the mistake-and all benefits of the doubt should be made in favor of the receiving party. In any
event, the producing party's ability to assert the privilege at subsequent points in the litigation (such as at
deposition or trial) should severely limit (if not eliminate) the receiving party's ability to exploit that which she may
have learned from the mistakenly produced document. For an overview of existing case law regarding this "fruits"
question, see Robert P. Mosteller, Admissibility of Fruitsof Breached Evidentiary Privileges:The Importance of
Adversarial Fairness,Party Culpability,and Fearof immunity, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 961 (2003).
104. See supratext accompanying notes 37-96.
105. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has applied all three approaches. Compare
Harmony Gold U.S.A., Inc. v. FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (strict approach), with Urban
Outfitters, Inc. v. DPIC Companies, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 376 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (middle approach), and Mendenhall v.
Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. 111.1982) (lenient approach). The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has
also applied all three approaches. CompareICI Ams. Inc. v. Wanamaker, CIV. A. No. 88-1346, 1989 WL 38647
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 18,1989) (strict approach), with In re Atl. Fin. Fed. Sec. Litig., Civ. A. No. 89-645,1992 WL 50074
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 1992) (middle approach), and Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Bass, CIV. A. No. 88-5257, 1989 WL 9354
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 1989) (lenient approach). The Southern District of New York has applied all three approaches,
although today the middle approach prevails. Compare United States v. IBM Corp., Civ. A. No. 69 Civ. 200, 1972
WL 666 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1972) (strict approach), rev'd 471 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1972), appeal dismissed,480
F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973), with Stoner v. New York City Ballet Co., No. 99 Civ. 0196, 2002 WL 31875404
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 2002) (middle approach), and Conn. Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 451
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (lenient approach).
106. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia has applied the strict and lenient
approaches. CompareBellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Am. Bus. Lists, Inc., Civ. No. 1:90-CV-149-JEC, 1992
WL 338392 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 1992) (strict approach), with Lazar v. Mauney, 192 F.R.D. 324, 330 (N.D. Ga.
2000) (lenient approach). The District of Massachusetts has applied the strict and middle approaches. Compare
Int'l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445 (D. Mass. 1988) (strict approach), with Amgen Inc.
v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287 (D. Mass. 2000) (middle approach).
107. The district courts in the First Circuit have used the strict and middle approaches; the district courts in
the Second Circuit have used the strict, middle, and lenient approaches; the district courts in the Third Circuit have
used the strict, middle, and lenient approaches; the district courts in the Fourth Circuit have used the strict and
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Moreover, the absence of a uniform rule among the judicial districts is
inconsistent with the preference for uniform standards in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and can lead to forum shopping. A litigant asserting a federal claim in a
two-way document-intensive case in which both parties possess substantial
quantities of discovery documents (and for which venue is proper in more than one
judicial district, as is frequently the case with respect to entity-litigants), would
rationally initiate the lawsuit in a judicial district with common law precedent
favoring the lenient approach or, next in line, the middle approach, but, in any
event, avoiding any district that is obligated to follow, or which previously
followed, the strict approach. In contrast, a litigant asserting such a claim in a oneway document-intensive case would rationally initiate the lawsuit in a judicial
district with common law precedent favoring the strict approach.
Second, a rules-based standard would create a uniform standard for resolving
waiver issues in federal question and diversity cases. Although state law governs
privilege issues in diversity actions, 0t 8 district courts frequently rely on federal
common law rather than state law to resolve whether there has been any waiver and,
if so, the scope of that waiver."° In fact, the diversity cases in which the district
court missed the issue and incorrectly applied federal common law regarding waiver
of the privilege outnumber those in which the district court spotted the issue and
correctly applied state law. 0 This, of course, may or may not affect the ultimate

middle approaches; the district courts in the Sixth Circuit have used the middle and lenient approaches; the district
courts in the Seventh Circuit have used the strict, middle, and lenient approaches; the district courts in the Eighth
Circuit have used the middle and lenient approaches; the district courts in the Tenth Circuit have used the middle
and lenient approaches; and the district courts in the Eleventh Circuit have used the strict, middle, and lenient
approaches.
108. FED. R. EviD. 501 ("[Un civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law."); cf.Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1482
(8th Cir. 1996) (district court committed reversible error in failing to apply Missouri law in diversity action with
respect to the issue of whether inadvertent production of privilege document waived the privilege).
109. In several diversity cases, the district court has analyzed the waiver issue under federal common law
rather than state law. See, e.g., Herndon v. U.S. Bancorp Asset Mgmt. Inc., No. 4:05 CV 01446, 2007 WL 781788,
at *3-5 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 13,2007); Oxyn Telecomms., Inc. v. Onse Telecom, No. 01 Civ. 1012, 2003 WL 660848,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2003); Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., No. M18-302, 931745, 2003 WL 289640, at
*14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003); Purizer Corp. v. Battelle Mem'l Inst., No. 01 C 6360, 2002 WL 1400263, at *2
(N.D. 111.June 27, 2002); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Sers., No. 97 Civ. 6124, 2000 WL 744369, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 8,2000); Laquila Constr., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 98 Civ. 5920, 1999 WL 232901, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1999); F.C. Cycles Int'l, Inc. v. Fila Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64, 72-79 (D. Md. 1998); Fid.
& Deposit Co. v. McCulloch, 168 F.R.D. 516,521-23 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Asian Vegetable Research & Dev. Ctr. v.
Inst. of Int'l Educ., No. 94 Civ. 6551, 1995 WL491491, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1995); Ray Larsen Assocs.,
Inc. v. Nikko Am., Inc., No. 89 CIV. 2809, 1993 WL 307905, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1993); City of
Worchester v. HCA Mgmt. Co., 839 F. Supp. 86,89 n.2 (D. Mass. 1993); Desai v. Am. Int'l Underwriters, No. 91
CIV. 7735, 1992 WL 110731, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1992); F.D.I.C. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp.,
138 F.R.D. 479,482-84 (E.D. Va. 1991); Monarch Cement Co. v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 558,559-60
(D.Kan. 1990); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 133 F.R.D. 171 (D.
Kan. 1989); Baltica-Skandinavia Ins. Co. v. Booth, Potter, Seal & Co., Civ. A. No. 86-1967, 1987 WL 18588, at
*2-3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1987).
110. The district court has applied state law to the waiver issue in several diversity cases. See, e.g., Expert
Choice, Inc. v. Gartner, Inc., No. 3:03 CV 022234,2007 WL 951662, at *2 (D.Conn. Mar. 27, 2007) ("[A] federal
court sitting in diversity must apply state privilege law to determine if waiver of the attorney-client privilege has
occurred."); United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 233 F.R.D. 483, 487 (N.D. Miss. 2006)
("Mississippi privilege law thus governs this diversity action."); Atronic Int'l, GMBH v. SAI Semispecialists of
Am., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 160, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Because the basis for subject matter jurisdiction in the case at
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resolution of the waiver issue depending on whether the federal common law rule
is consistent with (or different from) the pertinent state rule but a uniform federal
rule would prevent these sorts of mistakes from occurring.
Moreover, a uniform federal rule would not undermine the policy choice
contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence with respect to the application of state
privilege law in diversity cases. Congress rejected the privilege rules initially
proposed by the Supreme Court for many reasons,"' but a recurring criticism was
the elimination of certain state-created privileges in favor of a limited number of
specifically identified federal privileges." 2 The proposed rules did not include, for
example, a physician-patient privilege or a newspersons privilege, and they severely
limited the marital communications privilege' 3-all of which were longstanding
privileges in many states. The absence of these privileges drew fire from all
quarters" 4 and ultimately led to Rule 501's deference to state privilege law in
diversity cases." 5 Congress concluded that a departure from state law could not be
justified and recognized that different privilege rules in state courts and
geographically proximate federal courts could lead to substantial forum shopping." 6
Although the suggested rule would displace state privilege law to some extent, the
impact would be slight. In fact, the suggested rule would lead to a different outcome
in only two situations. The suggested rule would affect those cases in which (a) the
pertinent state court applies the middle approach, (b) the producing party did not
conduct any pre-production review, (c) the producing party produced a substantial
hand is diversity of citizenship, the Court applies New York privilege law."); Fleet Bus. Credit Corp. v. Hill City
Oil Co., No. 01-02417, 2002 WL 31741282, at *1 ('.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2002) ("[Iln the absence of applicable
Tennessee law, a federal court sitting in a diversity case must 'fashion a rule of decision that the Tennessee
Supreme Court would most likely adopt' with respect to waiver due to the inadvertent production of a privileged
document. (quoting Royal Surplus Lines, Inc. v. Sofamor Danke Group, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 463, 484 (W.D.Tenn.
1998))); Lifewise Master Funding v. Telebank, 206 F.R.D. 298, 302 (D. Utah 2002) ("State law is the rule of
decision, therefore as to the Attorney/Client privilege and the issue of waiver, Utah state law provides the rule of
decision."); see also IMC Chems., Inc. v. Niro Inc., No. Civ. A. 98-2348, 2000 WL 1466495, at *6 (D. Kan. July
19, 2000); Cent. Die Casting & Mfg. Co. v. Tokheim Corp., No. 93 C 7692,1994 WL 444796, at *4 (N.D. 111.Aug.
15, 1994); Cunningham v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins., 845 F. Supp. 1403, 1410-11 (S.D. Cal. 1994); Robertson v.
Yamaha Motor Corp., 143 F.R.D. 194, 197 (S.D. l. 1992); Eureka Fin. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
136 F.R.D. 179, 184 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
111. The proposed rules submitted to Congress included nine specific privileges: required reports, lawyerclient, psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, communications to clergy, political vote, trade secrets, secrets of state
and other official information, and identity of informer. See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 8 (1973).
112. See FederalRules of Evidence: Hearing on H.R. 5463 Before the S. Comn on the Judiciary, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1974) (opening statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin) ("I am particularly pleased that the rules on
privileges have been deleted because, as submitted by the Supreme Court, they would have substantially and, in
many cases, unwisely altered important privileges presently recognized in many jurisdictions.").
113. S.REP. No.93-1277, at 6 (1974) ("[T]he husband-wife privilege drew fire as a result of the conscious
decision of the Court to narrow its scope from that recognized under present federal court decisions. The partial
doctor-patient privilege seemed to satisfy no one... .Much controversy also attended the failure to include a
newsman's privilege.").
114. See FederalRules of Evidence: Hearingon H.R. 5463, supranote 112, at 6(testimony of Rep. William
J. Hungate) ("I would say 50 percent of the complaints in our committee related to the section on privileges. It has
been the effort of the committee to draw this bill so that the law of privileges is left where we found it."); see also
S. REP. No. 93-1277, supra note 113 ("From the outset, it was clear that the content of the proposed privilege
provisions was extremely controversial....Since it was clear that no agreement was likely to be possible..., and
since the inability to agree threatened to forestall...passage of an entire rules package, the determination was made
that the specific privilege rules.. .should be eliminated.. .leaving the law in its current condition.....
115. SeeFED.R.EvID.501.
116. See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, supra note 111, at 9.
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number of privileged documents, but (d) the producing party asserted the privilege
within ten days of receiving notice of its mistake." 7 The suggested rule would also
affect those cases in which (a) the pertinent state court applies the lenient approach,
but (b) the producing party failed to assert the privilege within ten days of receiving
notice of a mistake."' Given the variables that must line up before there is a

117. Twelve states have at least one published appellate decision embracing the middle approach. These
states are Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New
York, Oregon, and West Virginia. See Floyd v. Coors Brewing Co., 952 P.2d 797, 809 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997),
rev'd, 978 P.2d 663 (Colo. 1999) ("We conclude that [the] so-called 'ad hoc' approach is the most appropriate
means to determine whether an alleged inadvertent disclosure should be considered a waiver of the privilege....");
Harp v. King, 835 A.2d 953,967 (Conn. 2003) ("We conclude that the 'middle of the road' or moderate approach
strikes the fairest balance between the competing policy interests of preserving confidential attorney-client
communications and encouraging the party seeking the benefit of the attorney-client privilege to take care in
handling of otherwise privileged material." (footnote omitted)); Abamar Hous. & Dev., Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady
D.cor, Inc., 698 So. 2d 276, 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ("Believing the better-reasoned rule to be the 'relevant
circumstances test,'...we conclude that petitioners did not waive the privilege."); Save Sunset Beach Coal. v. City
& County of Honolulu, 78 P.3d 1, 21-23 (Haw. 2003) (formally adopting middle approach and holding that
attorney-client privilege was waived due to inadvertent provision of privileged memorandum to expert witness who
thereafter listed it as a reference in an environmental impact statement when there was no indication that party took
any effort to protect memorandum and, when it learned of the mistake, waited for two months to assert privilege);
Dalen v. Ozite Corp., 594 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (111.
App. Ct. 1992) (adopting middle approach to resolving question
of waiver of work product immunity); JWP Zack, Inc. v. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 709 N.E.2d 336,
342 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) ("We believe the better approach is one that allows the trial court to consider all the
relevant circumstances in determining whether the protection of the privilege is to be forfeited because of an
accidental disclosure."); Elkton Care Ctr. Assocs. L.P. v. Quality Care Mgmt., Inc., 805 A.2d 1177, 1184 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2002) (agreeing "with those courts that have adopted an 'intermediate' (or 'middle') test, under which
the court makes a fact specific case-by-case analysis to determine whether the privilege has been waived" and
holding that the attorney-client privilege was waived due to inadvertent disclosure of privileged memorandum in
production of one-half box of documents when document contained legend indicating its privileged status and
attorney failed to assert privilege both before inspection and after it was designated for production); In re Reorg.
of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 681 N.E.2d 838, 841 (Mass. 1997) ("[A] client may be deemed to have met the burden
of establishing that a privilege exists and no waiver has occurred if adequate steps have been taken to ensure a
document's confidentiality... .Where it can be shown.. .that reasonable precautionary steps were taken, the
presumption will be that the disclosure was not voluntary and therefore unlikely that there has been a waiver.");
Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 763 P.2d 1144, 1152 (N.M. 1988) (adopting middle approach to resolving
question of waiver following the inadvertent production of documents during discovery); N.Y. Times Newspaper
Div. of the N.Y. Times Co. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 752 N.Y.S.2d 642, 645-46 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
("Disclosure of a privileged document generally operates as a waiver of the privilege unless it is shown that the
client intended to maintain the confidentiality of the document, that reasonable steps were taken to prevent
disclosure, that the party asserting the privilege acted promptly after discovering the disclosure to remedy the
situation, and that the parties who received the documents will not suffer undue prejudice if a protective order
against use of the document is issued."); Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest Partners, Ltd., 838 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Or.
1992) ("A court need not necessarily conclude that the lawyer-client privilege has been waived when a document
has been produced during discovery. Factors to be considered by the court may be whether the disclosure was
inadvertent, whether any attempt was made to remedy any error promptly, and whether preservation of the privilege
will occasion unfairness to the opponent."); State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gaughan, 508 S.E.2d 75, 95 (W.Va.
1998) ("We, too, believe that the... 'middle test' strikes the proper balance in determining on a case-by-case basis
whether or not the inadvertent disclosure of attorney-client privileged communication constitutes a waiver of the
privilege.").
118. Ten states have at least one appellate decision, court rule, or evidence rule embracing the lenient
approach. These states are California, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Texas,
Wisconsin, and Utah. See State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc., 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 799, 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
("[W]e hold that 'waiver' does not include accidental, inadvertent disclosure of privileged information by an
attorney."); Hebert v. Anderson, 681 So. 2d 29, 31-32 (La. Ct. App. 1996) ("The letter from counsel to the doctors
is subject to the attorney-client privilege... .The inadvertent disclosure of this communication by defendants'
counsel does not constitute a waiver of that privilege."); Corey v. Norman, Hanson & Detroy, 742 A.2d 933, 941
(Me. 1999) ("We agree with the Superior Court and its adoption of the common sense rule set out in Mendenhall.
Underlying this rule is the notion that the client holds the privilege, and that only the client, or the client's attorney
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difference in the outcome between the application of state privilege law and the
application of the suggested rule, no principled basis exists to reject the suggested
rule simply because it can displace state law in some limited situations. The statecreated privilege (whether attorney-client, husband-wife, doctor-patient) would still
be recognized, but with only a modest difference in application of waiver principles
in the event of a mistake during document discovery.' 19
C. The Advantages of the ParticularRule Suggested in This Article
The rule suggested in this Article possesses several advantages, many of which
are present in one but not all of the existing approaches. First, the suggested rule
would be simple to apply and lead to predictable results. It is similar in this regard
to the strict and lenient approaches that focus on the objective fact of disclosure and
the client's subjective intent to waive the privilege, respectively. The suggested rule
requires resolution of only two factual issues: the date on which the producing party
received actual notice of a mistake and the date on which it asserted the privilege.
The parties should rarely disagree about these easily verified facts, but-when they
do-the district court will be able to resolve the dispute promptly following the
receipt of fairly truncated evidentiary submissions.

acting with the client's express authority, can waive the privilege. The rule focuses on the intent of the parties to
determine whether the disclosure was indeed inadvertent."); Leibel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 646 N.w.2d 179, 186
(Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (."
[T]o constitute a valid waiver, there must be an intentional, voluntary act or 'true waiver.'
Thus, a document inadvertently produced that is otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege remains
protected."' (quoting Franzel v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 600 N.W.2d 66 (1999))); PacifiCorp v. Dep't of Revenue, 838 P.2d
914, 919 (Mont. 1992) ("[Tlhe mere inadvertent production itself is not enough to establish voluntary
relinquishment of a known right... .Because PacifiCorp did not voluntarily relinquish a known right, an implied
intention to waive the privilege cannot be found." (citations omitted)); Schillaci v. First Fid. Bank, 709 A.2d 1375,
1381 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (release of privileged memorandum results in waiver only when it is
"knowing and intentional rather than inadvertent"); Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Huether, 454 N.w.2d 710, 719
(N.D. 1990) (construing North Dakota evidence rule as precluding finding of waiver due to inadvertent production
of documents because client did not have an "opportunity to claim the privilege"); Warrantech Corp. v. Computer
Adapters Servs., Inc., 134 S.w.3d 516, 525 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that because Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
193.3(d) authorizes producing party to claim privilege and retrieve document so long as it does so within ten days
of becoming aware of mistake, "a party who fails to diligently screen documents before producing them does not
waive a claim of privilege."); Harold Sampson Children's Trust v. Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Trust, 679 N.W.2d
794, 803 (Wis. 2004) ("[A] lawyer, without the consent or knowledge of a client, cannot waive the attorney-client
privilege by voluntarily producing privileged documents (which the attorney does not recognize as privileged) to
an opposing attorney in response to a discovery request. We hold that only the client can waive the attorney-client
privilege....").
119. A related issue involves the procedure for promulgating such a rule. The Rules Enabling Act authorizes
the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for use in the district courts
but requires the Supreme Court to submit any such rules to Congress for its consideration. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(a),
2074(a) (2000). Any such rule becomes effective seven months later unless Congress formally acts to amend or
abolish it. Id. § 2074(a). The Rules Enabling Act alters this procedure slightly when a rule creates, abolishes or
modifies an evidentiary privilege, in which circumstance the rule does not become effective unless formally
approved by Congress through legislation. Id. § 2074(b). The amendment to Rule 26(b)(5) suggested in this Article
would probably not require formal approval by Congress as it does not alter the privilege but rather establishes a
standard for resolving the issue of waiver. Moreover, the suggested rule is not more invasive than an earlier, 1993
amendment to the rule requiring the producing party to prepare a log identifying documents withheld on the ground
of privilege or immunity and indicating, in the Advisory Committee Notes, that failure to do so "may be viewed
as a waiver of the privilege or protection"-an amendment implemented without formal congressional approval
and for which there has not been any objection or concern. For a description of the rule-making process, see
Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to FederalCourtRule Making Procedure,22 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 323 (1991).
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Second, the suggested rule would promote equitable results by reducing the
number of instances in which the receiving party will be able to claim-credibly
andfairly-that it would be prejudiced from the loss of a document. A producing
party that discovers a mistake and seeks to reclaim a document before it has been
worked into the fabric of a case cannot, as a consequence of doing so, cause any
hardship for the receiving party. Similarly, a receiving party that recognizes a
mistake but fails to alert the producing party of the problem cannot fairly complain
when the producing party ultimately seeks to reclaim the document because any
"prejudice" would be entirely of its own making. The suggested rule should reduce
(if not eliminate) situations in which the receiving party will be prejudiced by the
producing party's ability to reclaim a document.
Third, the suggested rule would generate the same outcome regarding waiver as
that generated by the fact-intensive middle approach-thus permitting substantial
cost savings without sacrificing any accuracy in decision making. In fact, the
suggested rule would have generated the same outcome in most of the cases in
which the district court utilized the middle approach. 2 ° The significance of this
cannot be overstated: the suggested rule would generate substantial cost savings to
the parties with respect to pre-production review, as well as post-production motion
practice, without sacrificing any accuracy in decision making in the event of a
mistake.
Fourth, the suggested rule would harmonize the emerging ethical standard
regarding the handling of inadvertently produced documents with the evidentiary
rules regarding waiver of the privilege. An attorney should not feel whipsawed
between an obligation imposed by a state bar association and an opportunity for
tactical gain that is implicitly authorized by the evidentiary rules. The suggested
rule makes the evidentiary rule consistent with the ethical standard and thus better
ensures that attorneys can fulfill their obligation of fair play as well as their
obligation of zealous representation.
CONCLUSION
The potential loss of a privilege or immunity due to the inadvertent production
of a document is a problem that haunts litigants in nearly all civil cases-and which
will haunt increasing numbers of litigants as information is more easily stored in
computers and related devices. The drafters of the federal rules plainly envisioned
that document discovery would play an integral role in investigating claims and
defenses and, ultimately, preparing cases for trial. They could not have anticipated
(much less desired) that litigants would become bogged down by the timeconsuming and expensive process of reviewing documents for privilege-a task that
frequently dwarfs the time and expense associated with the actual trial of a case.
The rule suggested in this Article does not solve all the problems associated with
document discovery in civil cases, but it does address a recurring problem for which
a fix is available and should be implemented.

120. The district courts rarely find waiver in the face of prompt action by the producing party upon learning
of its mistake. The cases in which prompt action is deemed insufficient are few and highly abberational.
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By focusing on the time taken by the producing party to seek corrective action
upon learning of a mistake, litigants would be liberated from the obligation to
review documents before production and given the flexibility to review them (or
not) in relation to the stakes involved and their ability to pay.
This could prove useful in those cases in which there are extraordinary quantities
of documents that are within the universe of potentially relevant documents but
little concern that privileged documents might be lurking in them. This could prove
equally useful in those cases in which the parties simply cannot afford to pay
lawyers to review documents prior to production solely for the purpose of culling
the limited number that may be privileged.
Moreover, the courts would be liberated from the burdensome responsibility of
deciding motions regarding waiver in the context of a motion to compel or a motion
for a protective order. The courts would simply be required to resolve two factual
issues: when the producing party learned of the mistake and when the producing
party asked to have the document returned. These factual issues could be resolved
quickly and efficiently following the submission of straightforward memoranda
from the parties.

